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Abstract—The secrecy of a communication system in which
both the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper are allowed
some distortion is investigated. The secrecy metric considered is
the exponent of the probability that the eavesdropper estimates
the source sequence successfully within an acceptable distortion
level. The problem is first studied when the transmitter and the
legitimate receiver do not share any key and the transmitter
is not subject to a rate constraint, which corresponds to a
stylized model of a side channel and reveals connections to source
coding with side information. The setting is then generalized to
include a shared secret key between the transmitter and the
legitimate receiver and a rate constraint on the transmitter,
which corresponds to the Shannon cipher system. A single-letter
characterization of the highest achievable exponent is provided,
and asymptotically-optimal strategies for both the primary user
and the eavesdropper are demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
To compromise the security of a communication network,
an eavesdropper need not have direct access to the decrypted
content of the transmitted packets. In fact, simply monitoring
and analyzing the network flow may help an eavesdropper
deduce sensitive information. For example, Song et al. [1]
show that the Secure Shell (SSH) is vulnerable to what is
called timing attacks. In SSH, each keystroke is immediately
sent to the remote machine, and an eavesdropper can thus
observe the timing of the keystrokes. It is shown that this
information can be used to significantly speed up the search
for passwords, and it is estimated that each consecutive pair
of keystrokes leaks around 1 bit of information. Zhang and
Wang [2] enhance the attack proposed in [1], and apply it
in the setting of multi-user operating systems, in which a
malicious user eavesdrops on other users’ keystrokes. Timing-
based attacks appear also in various other settings, including:
compromising the anonymity of users in networks [3,4],
information leakage in the context of shared schedulers [5]
and in the context of on-chip networks [6].
In this paper, we consider a stylized model of such infor-
mation leakage problems, and call it the information blurring
system. The setup, shown in Figure 1, consists of the following.
A transmitter observes a sequence Xn, which corresponds
roughly to the original timing vector, and maps it to a sequence
Y n that is observed by both the legitimate receiver and an
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Fig. 1. Information blurring system: both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper are allowed a certain distortion level.
eavesdropper. The mapping must almost surely satisfy a distor-
tion constraint, which corresponds to some quality constraints
imposed by the network (e.g., delay constraints). We do not
require the mapping to be causal as the intent of this work is
to provide fundamental limits for a simplified version of the
information leakage problem. In broad terms, the transmitter
wants to blur the information in Xn (hence the name), so
that it is no longer useful for the eavesdropper. For example,
one approach is to artificially add noise to the input sequence.
In that sense, the problem is related to methods for ensuring
differential privacy, in which a curator wants to publicly
release statistical information about a given population without
compromising the privacy of its individuals [7,8].
Upon observing the output Y n, the eavesdropper, who
knows the source statistics and the transmitter’s encoding func-
tion, tries to estimate Xn. We introduce a distortion function
and consider the eavesdropper’s estimate to be successful if
the distortion it incurs is below a given level. Hence, we
measure the secrecy guaranteed by a given scheme via the
probability that the eavesdropper makes a successful guess.
The primary user (i.e., the transmitter legitimate-receiver pair)
aims then to minimize that probability. Since computing the
exact probability is quite difficult, this paper will be mainly
concerned with asymptotic analysis: we will derive the rate of
decay (i.e., the exponent) of the probability of a successful
guess. Other metrics for quantifying secrecy exist in the
literature; we discuss the motivations and the shortcomings
of the commonly used ones in Section II.
For a discrete memoryless source (DMS), we provide
a single-letter characterization of the optimal exponent (cf.
Theorem 1). We show that the problem is related to source
coding with side information. Essentially, the eavesdropper
first attempts to guess the joint type of Xn and Y n. S/he, then,
“pretends” that Y n is received through a memoryless channel
the probability law of which is the conditional probability
P (Y |X) induced by the joint type. The problem can be
viewed at this point as compression with side information,
so the eavesdropper picks a codeword from an optimal rate-
ar
X
iv
:1
50
7.
02
34
2v
3 
 [c
s.I
T]
  3
1 M
ar 
20
17
2distortion code. The primary user’s objective, therefore, is to
supply the “worst” side information. Moreover, we demon-
strate asymptotically-optimal universal schemes for both the
primary user and the eavesdropper. The schemes are universal
in the sense that they do not depend on the source statistics.
In particular, the transmitter operates on a type-by-type basis,
and associates with each type a rate-distortion code, the
construction of which is based on the conditional probability
law that provides the “worst” side information given that type.
Next, we extend the study to the setup in which the
transmitter is subject to a rate constraint, and the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver have access to a common source of
randomness, called the key. The eavesdropper has full knowl-
edge of the encryption system, except for the realization of the
key and the realization of Xn. The setup is shown in Figure 2,
and the special case in which the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper must reconstruct the source exactly is known as
the Shannon cipher system [9]. Since the transmitter is subject
Fig. 2. The Shannon cipher system with lossy communication: the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver have access to a common key K, which consists of
nr purely random bits, where r is called the key rate. The transmitter encodes
Xn using K, and sends a message M through a noiseless public channel of
rate R. Both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are allowed a certain
level of distortion. The legitimate receiver generates the reconstruction Y n
based on M and K, whereas the eavesdropper has access to M only to
produce an estimate V n.
to a rate constraint, we allow the primary user to violate
the distortion constraint, but restrict the probability of such
event to be exponentially decaying. We again derive a single-
letter characterization of the optimal exponent (cf. Theorem 2),
and demonstrate asymptotically-optimal strategies for both the
primary user and the eavesdropper. In particular, similarly to
the previous setting, the transmitter operates on a type-by-type
basis and associates with each type a rate-distortion code, the
construction of which is based on the conditional probability
law that provides the worst side information and satisfies the
rate constraint (however, types with low enough probability
are discarded, by associating a dummy messsage to all the
source sequences belonging to such types). To make use of
the shared key, we (randomly) generate many instances of
such codes, and use the secret key to randomize the choice
of the code selected for encoding Xn. We also investigate
conditions under which the resulting codes are optimal rate-
distortion codes. As for the eavesdropper, we show that one
of the following two schemes is optimal. The first consists of
generating a blind guess, i.e., completely ignoring the public
message. The second consists of guessing the value of the key
to reproduce the reconstruction at the legitimate receiver, and
then applying the strategy developed in the first part of the
paper.
We note that Theorem 2 subsumes Theorem 1 by setting the
key rate to be zero, and the channel rate to be high enough.
We nevertheless present them separately for two reasons. We
believe the information blurring system to be of independent
interest, as it corresponds to problems different from the
Shannon cipher system (e.g., the SSH timing attack). As such,
Theorem 1 can serve as a baseline for future refinements
of this model (say, by requiring the encoding to be causal).
Moreover, it significantly simplifies the exposition of the
results, by first revealing the connection to source coding with
side information and then introducing the key and the rate
constraint.
Finally, it should be noted that Weinberger and Merhav
studied the Shannon cipher system with lossy communica-
tion [10,11] (i.e, the setup of the second part of this paper),
and independently suggested the same secrecy metric we pro-
posed. Furthermore, they allowed a variable key rate. In their
initial work [10], they derived the optimal exponent under the
assumption that the distortion constraint of the eavesdropper is
more lenient than that of the legitimate receiver (which makes
the no-key problem degenerate). Our initial work (an earlier
submission of the current paper) characterized the optimal
exponent only under certain conditions (including the no-key
case), which are not satisfied in the setting of [10], and pro-
vided general upper and lower bounds. As such, those results
were not comparable with that of [10]. Weinberger and Merhav
later [11] generalized their result to characterize the exponent
in general, as is done here. However, the suggested scheme
herein and its subsequent analysis are significantly simpler.
In particular, our scheme uses a traditional random coding
construction followed by a separate key-based randomization.
II. SECRECY METRIC
The information-theoretic study of secrecy systems was
initiated by Shannon in [9]. Shannon derived the following
negative result: ensuring perfect secrecy, i.e., making the
source sequence Xn and the public message M (cf. Figure 2)
statistically independent, requires that the key rate be at least
as large as the message rate.
As opposed to perfect secrecy, the notion of “partial” se-
crecy is more difficult to quantify. However, the impracticality
of ensuring perfect secrecy, as implied by Shannon’s result,
means that developing such a notion is important from a
practical point of view as well as a theoretical one. Shannon
used equivocation — the conditional entropy of the source
sequence given the public message H(Xn|M) — as a “the-
oretical secrecy index”. A main motivation for equivocation
was the similarity between the deciphering problem for the
eavesdropper in the secrecy setting and the decoding problem
for the receiver in the standard noisy communication set-
ting [9]. Equivocation has subsequently been used as a secrecy
metric in several works [12]–[18]. However, its use is not well
motivated operationally. It only provides a lower bound on the
exponent of the list size that the eavesdropper must generate
to reliably include the source sequence. Moreover, Massey
showed in [19] that the expected number of guesses that need
3to be made to correctly guess a discrete random variable X
may be arbitrarily large for arbitrarily small H(X).
Merhav and Arikan [20] proposed a more direct approach:
they consider an i.i.d. source and they measure secrecy by
the expected number of guesses that the eavesdropper needs
to make before finding the correct source sequence, which
they denote by E[G(Xn|M)], where G(.|m) is a “guessing”
function defined for each possible public message m. This is
intended to capture the scenario in which the eavesdropper has
a testing mechanism to check whether or not his/her guess is
correct. Such mechanism exists, for example, if the source
message is a password to a computer account. When the
source is discrete and memoryless, and the transmitter and the
legitimate receiver have access to nr purely random common
bits (where r is called the key rate), the optimal exponent of
E[G(Xn|M)] is found to be [20, Theorem 1]:
E(P, r) , lim
n→∞
1
n
logE[G(Xn|M)]
= max
Q
{min{H(Q), r} −D(Q||P )} , (1)
where P is the source distribution and D(·||·) is the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence. Two issues arise with this metric.
First, even if a testing mechanism exists, any practical system
would only allow a small number of incorrect inputs. Thus,
it is not clear how to interpret an exponentially large number
of guesses. Second, and more importantly, it turns out that
even highly-insecure systems can appear to be secure under
this metric. Indeed, by modifying the asymptotically-optimal
scheme proposed in [20], we can construct a scheme for the
primary user that allows the eavesdropper to find the source
sequence correctly with high probability by the first guess, and
yet achieves the optimal exponent in (1). The scheme proposed
in [20] operates on the source sequences on a type-by-type
basis, and it yields:
E
[
G(Xn|M)∣∣Xn ∈ TQ] ≥ 2nmin{r,H(Q)}−o(n), (2)
where o(n)/n→ 0 as n→∞, and TQ is the type class of a
given type Q, i.e., the set of sequences with empirical distri-
bution Q. Averaging over the probabilities of {TQ} yields the
exponent in (1) (as a lower bound). However, this means that it
is enough to apply the proposed scheme to the type class TQ
that achieves the maximum of [min{H(Q), r} −D(Q||P )],
whereas sequences belonging to other type classes can be sent
with no encoding whatsoever with no effect on the exponent.
Therefore, only a set with vanishing probability is encoded,
whereas sequences outside that set are immediately known by
the eavesdropper1.
A different approach, based on rate-distortion theory, was
adopted by Yamamoto in [21]. A distortion function is intro-
duced and the secrecy of a given scheme is measured by the
minimum attainable expected distortion at the eavesdropper.
Also, a certain level of distortion, possibly corresponding to
a different distortion function, is allowed at the legitimate
1Merhav and Arikan actually characterize, for any ρ > 0, the exponent of
E[Gρ(Xn|M)]. This more general result can still yield large exponents for
systems that are highly insecure, although one could potentially address this
issue by requiring schemes that yield large exponents simultaneously over a
range of ρ values.
receiver. An earlier work by Yamamoto [22] considered the
special case where no key is available, under the same secrecy
metric. A standard example, discussed and generalized in [23],
shows why expected distortion is inadequate: Suppose Xn is
a sequence of independent and identically distributed bits with
Xi ∼ Ber(1/2), the transmitter and the legitimate receiver have
access to one common bit K ∼ Ber(1/2), and the distortion
function is the Hamming distance. The transmitter then sends
the sequence Xn as is if K = 0, and flips all its bits if K = 1.
The induced expected distortion at the eavesdropper is then
equal to 1/2, which is also the maximum expected distortion
that the eavesdropper can possibly incur, since it is achievable
even if the public message is not observed. However, this
“optimal” scheme in fact reveals a lot about the true source
sequence; namely, it is one of only two possible candidates.
To overcome this limitation of expected distortion, Schieler
and Cuff [24,25] allow the eavesdropper to generate an
exponentially-sized list of estimates and propose the expected
minimum distortion over the list as a secrecy metric. It is
not clear, however, how to operationally interpret a list of
exponential size. It is shown that this setting is equivalent to
the following: there exists a “henchman” that has access to the
source sequence Xn and public message M , and can transmit
nRL bits to the eavesdropper who measures secrecy by the
minimum expected distortion. However, this metric leads to
a degenerate trade-off between the key rate r, the allowed
list exponent (henchman rate) RL, and the expected minimum
distortion in the list De. For example, if the legitimate receiver
must reconstruct Xn losslessly, one of two cases occurs (see
[25, Theorem 1]): If r > RL, De is given by the rate-distortion
function at RL. If r ≤ RL, De = 0 since the eavesdropper can
trivially find the exact sequence by listing all the possible keys.
This fails to capture that, even when RL < r, the eavesdropper
can still list 2nRL possible keys and thus recover exactly the
correct sequence with probability at least 2n(RL−r). As RL
approaches r, this probability can be made to decay arbitrarily
slowly. It is worth noting that Schieler and Cuff also consider
a causal disclosure setting [23], in which the eavesdropper
observes, at time i, the public message M and Xi−1. Although
this is more robust than expected distortion, it captures only
a limited range of practical scenarios.
In this paper, we take a different approach. In many applica-
tions, the eavesdropper has no way to verify if his/her estimate
is correct. This is particularly true in our main case of interest,
i.e., timing of events. Moreover, as mentioned before, most
practical systems allow a small number of incorrect guesses
even if a testing mechanism exists. Therefore, we allow the
eavesdropper to make one guess only. Secrecy is measured
then by the probability that the guess is successful, i.e., the
distortion incurred is below a given level. For the purposes of
the asymptotic analysis in this paper, we will study only the
exponent of the probability of a successful guess. A special
case of such analysis was considered by Merhav in [26].
In particular, [26] is concerned with necessary and sufficient
conditions for achieving the perfect secrecy exponent, which
is the exponent attained by the eavesdropper in the absence of
any observation. It is also restricted to the case in which both
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper must reconstruct
4the source sequence exactly. Finally, a relevant earlier work
by Arikan and Merhav [27] considers the problem of blindly
guessing a random variable up to a distortion level and
characterizes the least achievable exponential growth of the
expected number of guesses.
III. INFORMATION BLURRING SYSTEM
We consider the following secrecy system. Let X , Y , and V
be the alphabets associated with the transmitter, the legitimate
receiver, and the eavesdropper, respectively. The transmitter
wants to provide the legitimate receiver with a quantized
version of an n-length message Xn = (X1, X2, · · · , Xn). It
thus generates a vector Y n through a (possibly randomized)
function f : Y n = f(Xn). For a given distortion function
d : X × Y → R+, the quantization is required to satisfy a
constraint of the form d(Xn, Y n) = 1n
∑n
i=1 d(Xi, Yi) ≤ D
for a given distortion level D. The restriction is imposed
on each realization of (Xn, Y n). An eavesdropper, with an
associated distortion function de : X ×V → R+, also observes
Y n and generates a guess V n = g(Y n), aiming to have
de(X
n, V n) = 1n
∑n
i=1 de(Xi, Vi) ≤ De for a given distortion
level De.
It is assumed that the eavesdropper knows the source statis-
tics and the primary user’s encoding function f . The secrecy
metric we adopt is the probability that the eavesdropper makes
a successful guess, i.e., Pr(de(Xn, V n) ≤ De). The primary
user’s objective is to minimize this probability. So, the problem
can be written as:
min
fn
max
gn
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, gn(fn(X
n))
)
≤ De
)
.
We characterize the highest achievable exponent of the prob-
ability of a successful guess under the following assumptions:
(A1) The alphabets X , Y and V are finite.
(A2) The source is memoryless, and without loss of general-
ity, its distribution has full support.
(A3) The distortion functions d and de are bounded, i.e.,
there exists Dmax and De,max such that, for all x ∈
X , y ∈ Y , and v ∈ V , d(x, y) ≤ Dmax and
de(x, v) ≤ De,max. Moreover, D ≥ Dmin, where
Dmin = maxx∈X miny∈Y d(x, y). Similarly, De ≥
De,min, where De,min = maxx∈X minv∈V de(x, v).
We denote the optimal exponent by E(P,D,De), where P
is the source distribution, i.e.,
E(P,D,De) =
lim
n→∞max{fn}
min
{gn}
− 1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn(fn(X
n))
)
≤ De
)
,
(3)
where {fn} is restricted to the class of functions ensuring the
feasibility of the primary user’s problem. The existence of the
limit will be seen later.
We will show that the problem is related to source coding
with side information, where Y n acts as side information
for the eavesdropper. Therefore, the primary user’s job is to
provide the “worst” side information subject to a distortion
constraint of his/her own. To this end, we denote the condi-
tional rate-distortion function as:
R(PXY , De) = min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V )]≤De
I(X;V |Y ), (4)
and define the quantity R(PX , D,De) as:
R(PX , D,De) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y )]≤D
R(PXY , De). (5)
Roughly speaking, when the joint type of Xn and Y n
is PXY , the eavesdropper can restrict the guessing space
to 2nR(PXY ,De) reconstruction sequences, knowing that at
least one of them must satisfy the distortion constraint. The
maximization in (5) corresponds to the primary user’s goal
of maximizing that quantity.
We prove the following properties of R(PXY , De) and
R(PX , D,De) in Appendix A.
Proposition 1: In the following statements, the domains of
D and De are [Dmin,+∞) and [De,min,+∞), respectively.
(P1) For fixed PXY , R(PXY , De) is a finite-valued,
non-increasing convex function of De. Furthermore,
R(PXY , De) is a uniformly continuous function of the
pair (PXY , De).
(P2) For fixed PX , R(PX , D,De) is a finite-valued function
of (D,De). Moreover, for fixed De, R(PX , D,De) is a
uniformly continuous function of the pair (PX , D).
(P3) Re(PX , De) − R(PX , D) ≤ R(PX , D,De) ≤
Re(PX , De), where R(PX , D) and Re(PX , De) are the
rate-distortion functions corresponding to the distortion
constraints d and de, respectively.
Our main result is the characterization of the optimal exponent
as follows:
Theorem 1: Under assumptions (A1)-(A3), for any DMS
P , and distortion functions d and de with associated distortion
levels D ≥ Dmin and De ≥ De,min, corresponding respec-
tively to the primary user and the eavesdropper:
E(P,D,De) = min
Q
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,D,De), (6)
where Q ranges over all probability distributions on the source
alphabet, and R(Q,D,De) is as defined in (5).
Remark 1: We do not require any -backoff for D or De
to characterize the associated exponent.
An interesting feature of Theorem 1 is the emergence of
mutual information as part of the solution in (6), even though
the setup does not include any rate constraints. Moreover, an
interesting contrast can be seen between the expression in (1)
for the expected number of guesses metric and the expression
in (6) for our metric. Indeed, the former evaluates the perfor-
mance of a given scheme asymptotically by a weighted best-
case scenario, whereas the latter evaluates it by a weighted
worst-case scenario.
As an application of the theorem, we compute the perfect
secrecy exponent, which we define as the best achievable
exponent when the primary user is not subject to any constraint
5and denote it by E0(P,De). To this end, we introduce a trivial
distortion function: d(x, y) = 0, for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
Then, R(Q,D) = 0, for all Q and all D ≥ 0. It then follows
from (P3) of Proposition 1 that R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De)
for all Q. Therefore,
E0(P,De) = min
Q
D(Q||P ) +Re(Q,De). (7)
The next two subsections are devoted to proving Theorem 1.
We first propose a scheme for the primary user and show that
the induced exponent is lower-bounded by the right-hand side
of (6). From the eavesdropper’s point of view, this is a converse
result. Similarly, we propose a scheme for the eavesdropper
and show that the induced exponent is upper-bounded by the
right-hand side of (6), which establishes the desired result.
We set some notation for the remainder of the paper. In the
following, Z is an arbitrary discrete set, and Z is a random
variable over Z .
- The set of probability distributions over Z is denoted by
PZ .
- For a sequence zn ∈ Zn, Qzn is the empirical PMF of
zn, also referred to as its type.
- QnZ is the set of types in Zn, i.e., the set of rational
PMF’s with denominator n.
- For QZ ∈ QnZ , the type class of QZ is TQZ , {zn ∈
Zn : Qzn = QZ}.
- EQ[·], HQ(·), and IQ(·; ·) denote respectively expecta-
tion, entropy, and mutual information taken with respect
to distribution Q.
- All logarithms and exponentials are taken to the base 2.
A. Achievability for the Primary User (Eavesdropper’s Con-
verse Result)
Let
E−(P,D,De) =
lim inf
n→∞ max{fn}
min
{gn}
− 1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn(fn(X
n))
)
≤ De
)
.
(8)
We will show that E−(P,D,De) ≥ minQD(Q||P ) +
R(Q,D,De).
The primary user will operate on the source sequences on a
type-by-type basis. For each type QX ∈ QnX , we create a rate
distortion code CQX to cover each sequence in TQX as follows.
We associate with QX a joint type QXY from QnXY(QX , D):2
QnXY(QX , D) =
{PXY ∈ QnXY : PX = QX , EPXY [d(X,Y )] ≤ D}. (9)
The code is then constructed from TQY as given by the
following lemma, which bounds the size of the code.
Lemma 2: Given  > 0, there exists n0 (, |X |, |Y|)
such that for any n ≥ n0, for each joint type QXY ∈
QnXY , there exists a code (yn1 , yn2 , · · · , ynN ) such that N ≤
2Assumption (A3) guarantees that QnXY (QX , D) is nonempty for any
QX .
2n(IQXY (X;Y )+), and for all xn ∈ TQX , there exists i
satisfying (xn, yni ) ∈ TQXY .
The proof is a refinement of the covering lemma [28, Lemma
2.4.1]. We later prove a stronger result, Lemma 9, in Ap-
pendix E.
Remark 2: One might be tempted to use an optimal rate-
distortion code for each type QX , presuming that this choice is
best at preserving secrecy since it achieves optimal compres-
sion, i.e., it only sends the necessary information. However, the
problem is more subtle since the “redundancy of information”
depends on the eavesdropper’s distortion constraint de. The
optimal choice of QXY will be revealed when analyzing the
eavesdropper’s optimal strategy.
Now, fix  > 0 and let n be at least as large as n0
in Lemma 2. We will denote by CnQX the rate distortion
code associated with type QX . Thus, the function f of the
primary user is as follows: each sequence xn is mapped to a
sequence yn ∈ CnQxn satisfying Qxnyn = QXY (where QXY
is associated with Qxn ) and subsequently d(xn, yn) ≤ D.
To determine the eavesdropper’s optimal guess, we define
BDe(v
n) = {xn ∈ Xn : de(xn, vn) ≤ De}. Then, for each
observed yn, the optimal rule is given by
g(yn) = argmax
vn∈Vn
∑
xn∈BDe (vn)
p(xn|yn).
This can be understood as the MAP rule, and we denote in the
remainder by3 go (where “o” stands for optimal). To upper-
bound the probability of a correct guess, we consider a genie-
aided rule that is aware of the type of the transmitted source
sequence. That is, the genie-aided MAP rule yields
go(y
n, QX) = argmax
vn∈Vn
∑
xn∈BDe (vn)∩QX
p(xn|yn, Xn ∈ TQX ).
Remark 3: One should not expect the upper bound to be
loose since there are only polynomially many types in n, so
that the exponent is not affected.
For a given yn, let f−1QX (y
n) = {xn ∈ TQX : f(xn) = yn}
be the set of sequences in TQX that are mapped to it. Then,
the observation of yn implies that Xn ∈ f−1QX (yn), and the
genie-aided MAP rules makes a successful guess if Xn ∈
BDe (go(y
n, QX)). Therefore, we will derive an upper bound
on the maximum possible size of the intersection of these two
sets. First, note that, xn ∈ TQX and f(xn) = yn implies that
Qxnyn = QXY , where QXY is the joint type associated with
QX . So f−1QX (y
n) ⊆ TQX|Y (yn) , {xn ∈ TQX : (xn, yn) ∈
TQXY }. Now, consider any vn ∈ Vn,∣∣∣BDe(vn)⋂ f−1QX (yn)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣BDe(vn)⋂TQX|Y (yn)∣∣∣
3The MAP rule depends on f and thus should be denoted by go,f . Since
this is obvious, we drop the subscript f for notational convenience.
6(a)
=
∑
PXY V ∈QnXYV :
PXY =QXY
EPXY V [de(X,V )]≤De
PY V =Qynvn
∑
xn:
(xn,yn,vn)∈TPXY V
1
(b)
=
∑
PXY V ∈Qn(QXY ,De):
PY V =Qynvn
|TPX|V,Y (vn, yn)|
≤ (n+ 1)|X ||Y||V| max
PXY V ∈Qn(QXY ,De):
PY V =Qynvn
|TPX|V,Y (vn, yn)|
(b)
≤ (n+ 1)|X ||Y||V| max
PXY V ∈Qn(QXY ,De):
PY V =Qynvn
2nHPXY V (X|V,Y ),
(10)
where
(a) follows from the fact that (xn, yn, vn) ∈ TPXY V ⇒
PY V = Qynvn .
(b) follows from the definition of Qn(QXY , De) as:
Qn(QXY , De) = {PXY V ∈ QnXYV : PXY = QXY ,
EPXY V [de(X,V )] ≤ De}. (11)
(b) follows from Lemma 1.2.5 in [28].
Therefore, for large enough n, we get
max
vn∈Vn
∣∣∣BDe(vn)⋂ f−1QX (yn)∣∣∣
≤ max
PXY V ∈Qn(QXY ,De)
2n(HPXY V (X|V,Y )+). (12)
Let P ?n(QXY ) be the joint type achieving the max in (12),
where the dependence on De is suppressed since it is fixed
throughout the analysis. We can now upper-bound the prob-
ability that the eavesdropper makes a successful guess as
follows:
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, go(f(X
n))
)
≤ De
)
≤ Pr
(
de
(
Xn, go (f(X
n), QXn)
)
≤ De
)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
P (xn)1
{
xn ∈ BDe
(
go
(
f(xn), Qxn
))}
=
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
yn∈CnQX
∑
xn∈TQX :
f(xn)=yn
P (xn)1
{
xn∈BDe
(
go
(
yn, QX
))}
(a)
≤
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
yn∈CnQX
2n(−D(QX ||P )−HQX (X))·
2n(HP?n(QXY )(X|V,Y )+)
(b)
≤
∑
QX∈QnX
2n(IQXY (X;Y )+−D(QX ||P )−HQX (X))·
2n(HP?n(QXY )(X|V,Y )+)
=
∑
QX∈QnX
2n(−D(QX ||P )−HQXY (X|Y )+HP?n(QXY )(X|V,Y )+2)
=
∑
QX∈QnX
2−n(D(QX ||P )+IP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y )−2), (13)
where
(a) follows from (12).
(b) follows from Lemma 2.
To interpret the exponent in (13), note that P ?n(QXY )
minimizes I(X;V |Y ) over Qn(QXY , De) (follows read-
ily from (12)). Therefore, IP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y ) is roughly
R(QXY , De). The eavesdropper’s scheme can then be seen
as picking a codeword from an optimal rate-distortion code
that uses side information generated according to QY |X .
Since QXY is the choice of the primary user, who is
interested in maximizing the exponents in (13), we define for
each QX ∈ QnX :
Q?(QX) ∈ argmax
QXY ∈QnXY(QX ,D)
IP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y ), (14)
where we have again suppressed the dependence on D and
De in the notation.
Remark 4: The maximization does not depend on the
source statistics, and consequently neither does the proposed
encoding function f .
With a slight abuse of notation, we rewrite P ?n(Q
?(QX)) as
P ?n(QX) to get
IP?n(QX)(X;V |Y ) = maxQXY ∈
QnXY(QX ,D)
IP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y )
= max
QXY ∈
QnXY(QX ,D)
min
QXY V ∈
Qn(QXY ,De)
IQXY V(X;V |Y ).
(15)
We can now rewrite (13) as
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, go(f(X
n))
)
≤ De
)
≤
∑
QX∈QnX
2−n(D(QX ||P )+IP?n(QX )(X;V |Y )−2)
≤ (n+ 1)|X | max
QX∈QnX
2−n(D(QX ||P )+IP?n(QX )(X;V |Y )−2).
(16)
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that  is
arbitrary, we get
E−(P,D,De) =
lim inf
n→∞ max{fn}
min
{gn}
− 1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn(fn(X
n))
)
≤ De
)
≥ min
Q
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,D,De), (17)
where the last inequality follows from the following proposi-
tion, the proof of which is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 3:
lim
n→∞ minQX∈QnX
[D(QX ||P ) + IP?n(QX)(X;V |Y )]
= min
Q
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,D,De).
B. Converse for the Primary User (Eavesdropper’s Achiev-
ability Result)
Let E+(P,D,De) =
lim sup
n→∞
max
{fn}
min
{gn}
− 1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn(fn(X
n))
)
≤De
)
.
(18)
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SUMMARY OF USEFUL NOTATION.
Notation Description
R(PXY , De) minPV |X,Y :E[de(X,V )]≤De I(X;V |Y )
R(PX , D,De) maxPY |X :E[d(X,Y )]≤D R(PXY , De)
BDe (v
n) xn ∈ Xn : de(xn, vn) ≤ De
QnXY (QX , D) PXY ∈ QnXY :PX = QX , EPXY [d(X,Y )] ≤ D.
QnXY (QY , D) PXY ∈ QnXY :PY = QY , EPXY [d(X,Y )] ≤ D.
Qn(QXY , De) PXY V ∈ Q
n
XYV :PXY = QXY ,
EPXY V [de(X,V )] ≤ De.
We will now show that E+(P,D,De) ≤ minQD(Q||P ) +
R(Q,D,De). This means that the eavesdropper can achieve
the exponent in (6) for any function f the primary user
implements.
We propose a two-stage scheme for the eavesdropper. In the
first stage, observing yn, s/he tries to guess the joint type of
xn and yn by choosing an element uniformly at random from
the set QnXY(Qyn , D), where
QnXY(QY , D) = {PXY ∈ QnXY :PY = QY ,
EPXY [d(X,Y )] ≤ D}.
(19)
The correct joint type must fall in this set since the restriction
d(Xn, Y n) ≤ D is imposed on each realization of (Xn, Y n).
We denote the function corresponding to this stage by g1 :
Yn → QnXY .
Remark 5: We differentiate between QnXY(QY , D) and
QnXY(QX , D) by their first argument. A summary of different
notations is given in Table I.
The eavesdropper then proceeds assuming g1(yn) is the
correct joint type. S/he randomly chooses a sequence from a
set that covers TQX|Y (y
n). To this end, we associate with each
joint type QXY a joint type QXY V from Qn(QXY , De) (cf.
Table I), and generate a sequence uniformly at random from
TQV |Y (y
n), where QV |Y is the conditional probability induced
by QXY V . We denote the function corresponding to this stage
by g2 : Yn ×QnXY → Vn. Thus, g(yn) = g2(yn, g1(yn)).
Remark 6: The above strategy does not depend on the
specifics of the function f implemented by the primary user,
i.e., it only uses the fact that d(Xn, f(Xn)) ≤ D. It is also
independent of the source statistics.
The following lemma lower-bounds the probability
that g2(yn, QXY ) generates a sequence V n satisfying
de(x
n, V n) ≤ De, for a given pair (xn, yn) ∈ TQXY , i.e.,
assuming the eavesdropper guesses the joint type correctly.
Lemma 4: Given joint type QXY V ∈ QnXY V and
(xn, yn) ∈ TQXY , if V n is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from TQV |Y (y
n), then Pr
(
V n ∈ TQV |X (xn)
) ≥
cn2
−nIQXY V (X;V |Y ), where cn = (n+ 1)−|X||Y||V|.
Proof:
Pr
(
V n ∈ TQV |X (xn)
) ≥ Pr (V n ∈ TQV |X,Y (xn, yn))
=
∣∣TQV |X,Y (xn, yn)∣∣∣∣TQV |Y (yn)∣∣
≥ cn2
nH(V |X,Y )
2nH(V |Y )
= cn2
−nI(X;V |Y ).
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 1.2.5 in [28].
Since the eavesdropper is interested in maximizing this
probability, s/he will associate, with each QXY , a joint type
achieving the maximum:
P ?n(QXY ) ∈ argmin
PXY V ∈Qn(QXY ,De)
I(X;V |Y ). (20)
Note that this is the same joint type achieving the maximum
in (12).
We can now lower-bound the probability that xn ∈
BDe(g(y
n)), for a given pair (xn, yn) satisfying d(xn, yn) ≤
D.
Lemma 5: Given (xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn satisfying
d(xn, yn) ≤ D, Pr (xn ∈ BDe(g(yn))) ≥
c′n2
−nIP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y ), where c′n = (n + 1)
−|X||Y|(|V|+1),
QXY = Qxnyn , and g is as described above.
Proof:
Pr(xn ∈ BDe(g(yn)))
=
∑
Q′XY ∈QnXY (Qyn ,D)
p(g1(y
n) = Q′XY )·
p
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g2(y
n, Q′XY )
))
≥ p(g1(yn) = Qxnyn)p
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g2(y
n, Qxnyn)
))
≥ (n+ 1)−|X||Y|p
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g2(y
n, QXY )
))
≥ (n+ 1)−|X||Y|(|V|+1)2−nIP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y ),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.
We now show that the above described scheme indeed
achieves the exponent in (6). Consider any possibly random
function f implemented by the primary user (and satisfying
the distortion constraint), and denote by Pf the induced joint
probability on (Xn, Y n). Now, consider the following chain
of inequalities.
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, g(f(Xn))
)
≤ De
)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn∈Yn
P (xn)Pf (y
n|xn)p (xn ∈ BDe(g(yn)))
(a)
≥ c′n
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn∈Yn
P (xn)Pf (y
n|xn)2−nIP?n(Qxnyn )(X;V |Y )
≥ c′n
∑
xn∈Xn
P (xn)
∑
yn∈Yn
Pf (y
n|xn)·
min
QXY ∈QnXY(Qxn ,D)
2−nIP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y )
= c′n
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
P (xn)·
8min
QXY ∈QnXY(QX ,D)
2−nIP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y )
(b)
= c′n
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
2−n(D(QX ||P )+HQX (X))·
2−nIP?n(QX )(X;V |Y )
(c)
≥ c′n(n+ 1)−|X|
∑
QX∈QnX
2−n(D(QX ||P )+IP?n(QX )(X;V |Y ))
≥ c′n(n+ 1)−|X| max
QX∈QnX
2−n(D(QX ||P )+IP?n(QX )(X;V |Y )),
(21)
where
(a) follows from Lemma 5.
(b) follows from (20) and (15).
(c) follows from Lemma 1.2.3 in [28](|TQX | ≥ (n+ 1)−|X|2nHQX (X)) .
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, we get
E+(P,D,De)
= lim sup
n→∞
max
{fn}
min
{gn}
− 1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn(fn(X
n))
)
≤De
)
≤ min
Q
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,D,De), (22)
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 3.
Combining (22) and (17) yields that the limit in (3) exists
and is equal to the expression given in (6), thus establishing
Theorem 1.
IV. LOSSY COMMUNICATION FOR THE SHANNON CIPHER
SYSTEM
We now consider the setup of the Shannon cipher system
with lossy communication. More precisely, the transmitter is
subject to a rate constraint, and the transmitter and legitimate
receiver share common randomness K ∈ K = {0, 1}nr,
where r > 0 denotes the rate of the key. K is uniformly
distributed over K and is independent of Xn. The transmitter
sends a message M = f(Xn,K) to the receiver over a
noiseless channel at rate R, i.e., M ∈ M = {0, 1}nR.
The receiver, then, generates Y n = h(M,K). Both func-
tions f and h are allowed to be stochastic, but must satisfy
Pr (d(Xn, Y n) > D) ≤ 2−nα, for a given reliability exponent
α > 0.
The message M is overheard by the eavesdropper who
knows the statistics of the source and the encoding and
decoding functions f and h. However, s/he does not have
access to the common randomness K.
As before, the relevant secrecy metric is the probability
of a successful guess, i.e., a guess V n = g(M) satisfying
de(X
n, V n) ≤ De. The optimal guess is determined, again,
by the MAP rule go.
We assume (A1)-(A3) (given in Section III) hold throughout
this section. We further assume4
(A4) R > Rα := maxQ:D(Q||P )≤αR(Q,D).
4For the primary user’s problem to be feasible, it is necessary to have
R ≥ maxQ:D(Q||P )≤αR(Q,D).
Let
−→
D = (D,De) and
−→
R = (R, r). For a given DMS P ,
distortion vector
−→
D , rate vector
−→
R , and reliability exponent
α, we denote the optimal exponent by E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α), i.e.,
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) =
lim
n→∞max{fn}
min
{gn}
− 1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn(fn(X
n,K))
)
≤De
)
,
(23)
where {fn} is restricted to the class of functions ensuring the
feasibility of the primary user’s problem. Similarly to (23),
we define E−(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) and E+(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) using the
lim inf and lim sup, respectively.
We extend the definition of R(PX , D,De) to account for
the rate constraint as follows. For a given distribution PX
satisfying R(PX , D) ≤ R,
R(PX , R,D,De) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y )]≤D
I(X;Y )≤R
R(PXY , De). (24)
Extending the properties of R(PX , D,De), we prove the
following properties of R(PX , R,D,De) in Appendix C.
Proposition 6: In the following statements, D ≥ Dmin,
De ≥ De,min, and a given pair (PX , R) satisfy R ≥
R(PX , D).
(P4) For fixed PX , R(PX , R,D,De) is a finite-valued
function of (R,D,De). Moreover, for fixed De,
R(PX , R,D,De) is continuous in the triple (PX , R,D)
over the set S = {(PX , R,D) : PX ∈ PX , D ≥
Dmin, R > R(PX , D)}.
(P5) Re(PX , De) − R(PX , D) ≤ R(PX , R,D,De) ≤
R(PX , D,De) ≤ Re(PX , De).
The main result is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), for any DMS
P , distortion functions d and de with associated distortion
levels D ≥ Dmin and De ≥ De,min, corresponding respec-
tively to the primary user and the eavesdropper, and reliability
exponent α:
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) =
min
{
E0(P,De), r + min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
D(Q||P )+R(Q,R,D,De)
}
.
(25)
Remark 7: The minimization over Q is due to the im-
position of an exponentially decaying probability of violat-
ing the distortion constraint. If we replace it instead by
Pr (d(Xn, Y n) > D) ≤ δ, for some small δ, then the second
term of (25) would collapse to r +R(P,R,D,De).
Remark 8: We can recover Theorem 1 by setting α = +∞,
r = 0, and R = log |Y|. Weinberger and Merhav’s re-
sult [10, Theorem 1] can also be recovered by noting that
the leniency assumption implies R(Q,R,D,De) = 0 for
all Q. Moreover, for any De > minv∈V EP [d(X, v)] and
r > 0, E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) > 0. Indeed, the first condition implies
Re(P,De) > 0, hence E0(P,De) > 0. This refines Schieler
9and Cuff’s observation [23] that any positive key rate drives the
distortion at the eavesdropper to its maximal expected value
with high probability.
A straightforward but useful corollary of Theorem 2 is a
necessary and sufficient condition on the key rate for the
achievability of the perfect secrecy exponent. In particular,
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) = E0(P,De) if and only if
r ≥ E0(P,De)− min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,R,D,De).
(26)
Let r0 be the minimum rate needed to achieve E0(P,De).
The condition in (26) is interesting in that it allows r0 to be
strictly less than E0(P,De), which itself satisfies E0(P,De) ≤
Re(P,De).
Remark 9: One might suspect that r ≥
maxQ:D(Q||P )≤αR(Q,D) is sufficient to achieve E0(P,De),
since we can use good rate-distortion codes for each type and
the number of available keys is large enough to completely
“hide” the source sequence within a type class. This is,
indeed, true as it implies the condition in (26):
D(Q||P ) +Re(Q,De)−D(Q||P )−Re(Q,De) +R(Q,D)
= R(Q,D),
⇒ min
Q′
[D(Q′||P ) +Re(Q′, De)]−D(Q||P )−Re(Q,De)
+R(Q,D) ≤ R(Q,D),
By Property (P5): min
Q′
[D(Q′||P ) +Re(Q′, De)]−D(Q||P )
−R(Q,R,D,De) ≤ R(Q,D),
⇒ E0(P,De) + max
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
[−D(Q||P )−R(Q,R,D,De)]
≤ max
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
R(Q,D).
The converse of Theorem 2 is based on the following anal-
ysis. To achieve the second exponent in (25), the eavesdropper
tries to guess the value of the key and then applies the scheme
suggested in the previous section. Taking into consideration
the rate constraint, the term R(Q,D,De) which appears in (6)
is replaced by R(Q,R,D,De). Also, taking into account the
modified distortion constraint, the minimization over all Q’s
which appears in (6) is replaced by a minimization over Q’s
satisfying D(Q||P ) ≤ α. The first exponent is the perfect
secrecy exponent (given in (7)), which the eavesdropper can
achieve even in the absence of any observation. The fact
that one of these two schemes achieves the optimal exponent
implies that the eavesdropper does not benefit from guessing
only part of the key. Either s/he guesses the entire key
correctly and proceeds, or s/he makes a completely blind
guess. Interestingly, a similar observation has been made by
Schieler and Cuff [25] in the context of minimum expected
distortion over a list.
To describe the achievability result, it is helpful to
rewrite (25) as:
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) = min
{
min
Q:D(Q||P )≥α
D(Q||P ) +Re(Q,De),
min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
D(Q||P )+min{r+R(Q,R,D,De), Re(Q,De)}
}
.
(27)
The primary user will operate as follows. For low-probability
types Q, particularly Q’s with D(Q||P ) > α, the transmitter
will send a dummy message. This is feasible because
we allowed some probability of violating the distortion
constraint. For such Q’s, the eavesdropper receives no
information. Therefore, the guessing exponent conditioned
on TQ is given by Re(Q,De), yielding the second
term of (27). For Q’s satisfying D(Q||P ) ≤ α, let
E(
−→
D,
−→
R,Q) = min{r + R(Q,R,D,De), Re(Q,D)}. This
can be understood as the exponent conditioned on Xn ∈ TQ.
For each such Q, we associate a joint type induced by a PY |X
that achieves the maximum in (24). Similarly to Section III-A,
we use this joint type to generate a rate-distortion code. This
roughly corresponds to the term R(Q,R,D,De). To take
advantage of the secret key, we in fact produce 2nr such
codes, and use the key to randomize the choice of the code,
yielding the additional r term. Since the eavesdropper can
always guess blindly and achieve the exponent Re(Q,D),
we get min{r + R(Q,R,D,De), Re(Q,D)}. We will show
in Lemma 9 that such random construction fails to achieve
the desired exponent with only doubly exponentially small
probability.
As mentioned, the code construction for each type depends
on the conditional PY |X achieving the maximum in (24).
A natural question arises: under what conditions does the
optimal test channel (which we will denote by P ?Y |X ) achieve
that max? One can readily verify that this holds when
R(Q,R,D,De) = 0 (e.g., the eavesdropper’s constraint is
more lenient than that of the legitimate receiver). We further
investigate this question by considering special cases of The-
orem 2.
A. Applications of Theorem 2
In the following, assume α = +∞. Hence, R >
maxQR(Q,D).
1) Perfect Reconstruction at the Eavesdropper: Suppose
V = X , and the eavesdropper is required to reconstruct
the source sequence perfectly, i.e., the secrecy metric is
Pr(V n = Xn). In our formulation, this is equivalent to setting
de to be the Hamming distance and De to 0. Then, for each
Q, we get
R(Q,R,D, 0) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y )]≤D
I(X;Y )≤R
R(PXY , 0)
= max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y )]≤D
I(X;Y )≤R
H(X|Y ) = HQ(X)−R(Q,D).
Note that the maximum is achieved by the optimal test
channel, and the exponent is given by
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R ) = min
Q
D(Q||P )+
min{r +HQ(X)−R(Q,D), HQ(X)},
10
where we have used the equivalent form (27). Note that, in
contrast to R(Q,R,D,De) = 0, this case corresponds to a
more lenient constraint at the legitimate receiver, which leads
us to our next example.
2) Binary Source with Hamming Distortion and De ≤ D:
Suppose X = Y = V = {0, 1}, d and de are both the
Hamming distance, and De ≤ D < 1/2. We prove the
following lemma in Appendix D.
Lemma 7: If De ≤ D < 1/2,
R(Q,D,De)
= Re(Q,De)−R(Q,D)
=

0, H(Q) ≤ H(De),
H(Q)−H(De), H(De) ≤ H(Q) ≤ H(D),
H(D)−H(De), H(Q) ≥ H(D).
It follows from property (P5) of Proposition 6 that
R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De)−R(Q,D)
⇒ R(Q,R,D,De) = Re(Q,De)−R(Q,D).
Therefore, the exponent is given by:
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R ) = min{E1, E2, E3},
where
E1 = min
{
D(Q||P ) : H(Q) ≤ H(De)
}
,
E2 = min
{
D(Q||P ) +H(Q)−H(De) :
H(De) ≤ H(Q) ≤ H(D)
}
,
and
E3 = min
{
D(Q||P )+
min{r +H(D)−H(De), H(Q)−H(De)} :
H(Q) ≥ H(D)
}
.
If X ∼ Ber(1/2), then D(Q||P ) = 1−H(Q), and the minima
corresponding to the first two cases reduce to 1−H(De). The
third minimum can be computed as follows:
min
Q:
H(Q)≥H(D)
1−H(De) + min{r +H(D)−H(Q), 0}
= 1−H(De) + min{r +H(D)− 1, 0}.
Therefore,
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R ) =
{
1−H(De), r ≥ 1−H(D),
r +H(D)−H(De), r < 1−H(D).
The resulting expression when r < 1 − H(D) admits a
simple geometric explanation, shown in Figure 3 below. Upon
observing the public message, the candidate source sequences
are clustered into 2nr balls. Each ball corresponds to a possible
value of the key K, and has volume 2nH(D) since it is
the pre-image of a possible reconstruction at the legitimate
receiver. For the eavesdropper, the maximum volume of the
ball that s/he can generate to “engulf” candidate sequences
Fig. 3. The dots represent sequences in a type class TQ. Each of the
2nr non-dashed circles represents a Hamming-distortion ball of radius D,
corresponding to a possible reconstruction at the legitimate receiver. Thus, dots
within the circle (in blue) represent candidate source sequences. The dashed
circle represents the distortion ball of radius De around the eavesdropper’s
reconstruction, and it fits entirely in a non-dashed circle.
is 2nH(De). Due to the structure of Hamming distortion,
this maximally-sized ball can fit entirely into any one of
the clusters, so that the probability of a successful guess is
2nH(De)2−n(r+H(D)). Note that the geometric interpretation
assumed that we are using good rate-distortion codes (to get
pre-images of volume 2nH(D)). The described structure is
also reminiscent of successive refinement [29]. These can be
explained by the following lemma.
Lemma 8: If R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De)−R(Q,D), then
the optimal test channel P ?Y |X achieves the maximum in (5).
Moreover, Q is successively refinable from D to De.
Proof: Consider the proof of the lower bound in (P3)
of Proposition 1. R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De) − R(Q,D)
implies that (55) is an equality. Hence, P ?Y |X achieves
the maximum. Moreover, (56) becomes an equality. Let
P
(1)
V |XY be the minimizer in (55), and P
(2)
V |XY the minimizer
in (56). Then, H
P?XY P
(1)
V |XY
(X|V ) ≤ H
P?XY P
(2)
V |XY
(X|V ) =
H
P?XY P
(1)
V |XY
(X|V, Y ) ≤ H
P?XY P
(1)
V |XY
(X|V ).
Therefore, P (1)V |XY satisfies E[de(X,V )] ≤ De and
H
P?XY P
(1)
V |XY
(X|V, Y ) = H
QP
(1)
V |X
(X|V ), i.e. the Markov
chain X − V − Y holds. Finally, note that I(X;V ) =
I(X; (V, Y )) = I(X;Y ) + I(X;V |Y ) = Re(Q,De),
implying that Q is successively refinable from D to De.
B. Achievability Proof
We show that E−(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) ≥ min{E0(P,D), r +
minQ:D(Q||P )≤αD(Q||P )+R(Q,R,D,De)} by demonstrat-
ing an encoding-decoding strategy for the primary user that
achieves the given exponent.
As before, the primary user will operate on the source
sequences on a type-by-type basis. The result is driven by the
following lemma, which is based on the analysis of Schieler
and Cuff [25] and the proof of which is given in Appendix E.
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Lemma 9: Let  > 0, n ∈ N, QXY ∈ QnXY be given.
Let N be an integer such that 2n(IQXY (X;Y )+2/3) ≤ N ≤
2n(IQXY (X;Y )+). Generate a code Cn = (Y n1 , Y n2 , . . . , Y nN )
by choosing N elements independently and uniformly at
random from TQY .
1) Covering: For xn ∈ TQX , define
C(xn) = {m ∈ [N ] : (xn, Y nm) ∈ TQXY }, (28)
Nxn = |C(xn)|, (29)
and the event
E = {Cn : there exists xn ∈ TQX such that Nxn = 0
or Nxn > 22n
}
. (30)
Then, there exists n1(, |X |, |Y|) (independent of QXY )
such that, for all n ≥ n1,
Pr(E) ≤ e−2n/7 . (31)
2) Guessing—single code: Suppose Xn ∼ Unif(TQX )
and Cn /∈ E . Let P CM |Xn be as follows. Given xn, M is
chosen uniformly at random from C(xn). Then, for all
n ≥ n1, for all vn ∈ Vn and all m ∈ [N ],
Pr(de(X
n, vn)≤De|M=m, Cn)≤2−n(R(QXY ,De)−4),
(32)
and
E[Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cn)|Ec] ≤
2−n(Re(QX ,De)−4), (33)
where the probabilities are computed with respected to
the randomness in P CM |Xn , and the expectation with
respect to the distribution of the code Cn.
3) Guessing—multiple codes: Let K be uniform over K =
[2nr], r > 0, and independent of Xn (which is uniform
over TQX ). For each k ∈ [2nr], generate Cnk as described
above. Define P {C
n
k }k
M |Xn,K as follows. Given k, if Ck ∈
E , then M is chosen uniformly at random from [N ]
independently of Xn. If Cnk /∈ E , then M is chosen
uniformly at random from Ck(Xn). Let,
E˜ =
{
{Ck}2nrk=1 : there exists m ∈ [N ] such that
max
vn∈Vn
Pr
(
de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, {Cnk }2
nr
k=1
)
>
2−n(min{Re(QX ,De),r+R(QXY ,De)}−8)
}
, (34)
where the probability is computed with respect to
P
{Cnk }k
M |Xn,K . Then, for all n ≥ n1,
Pr(E˜) ≤ e−2n/9 , (35)
where the probability is computed with respected to the
distributions of the codes {Cnk }k. 
The first part of the Lemma asserts that if we generate the
codebook randomly, then each xn ∈ TQX will be covered by
a small number of codewords (the probability that this event
does not occur is doubly exponentially small). Therefore, if
we encode xn by choosing a codeword uniformly at random
from its cover, the induced PXn|Y n(.|yn) will be roughly
uniform over the set TQX|Y (y
n) = {xn : (xn, yn) ∈ TQXY }.
Consequently, given a codeword index m and vn ∈ Vn, the
second part bounds the probability that vn covers Xn, and
also bounds the expectation (over the choice of the codebook)
of that probability.
Finally, the third part considers generating 2nr codebooks
and the induced distribution PXn|M , where M is the index
of a chosen codeword. This distribution roughly corresponds
to generating 2nr elements uniformly at random from
TQY , revealing the chosen elements to the adversary, then
choosing one of them uniformly at random and generating
Xn uniformly at random from TQX|Y (Y
n). This setup is
similar to the one studied by Schieler and Cuff [25, Theorem
4]. Equation (35) states that, for most realizations of the
codebooks, the probability that the adversary generates a
successful guess, given a codeword index, is upper-bounded
by 2−n(min{Re(QX ,De),r+R(QXY ,De)}. The implication is that
the best the adversary could do is 1) either ignore the index
and guess Xn blindly, 2) or guess which codebook is being
used (i.e., guess the value of the key K) and use the scheme
suggested in the previous section.
Now, fix δ > 0 such that Rα+δ =
maxQ:D(Q||P )≤α+δ R(Q,D) < R. Note that such δ exists
since limδ→0Rα+δ = Rα (which follows from Proposition 13
in Appendix A and the fact that D(Q||P ) is convex). Fix R′
such that Rα+δ < R′ < R, and  > 0 such that  < R − R′.
Let
QnX (α, δ) = {Q ∈ QnX : D(Q||P ) ≤ α+ δ}. (36)
Let n be large as given by Lemma 9. For each type
QX ∈ QnX (α, δ), we associate a joint type QXY and generate
2nr codebooks {Ck}2nrk=1 ∈ E˜c where the size of each codebook
is upper-bounded by 2n(IQXY (X;Y )+) (the existence of such
codes follows from (35)). Since the primary user wants to
minimize the probability of a successful guess by the eaves-
dropper, but must also satisfy a rate constraint, the associated
type is chosen as follows:
Q?R′(QX) ∈ argmax
QXY ∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y )≤R′
R(QXY , De). (37)
The encoding function f is as follows. Given a source
sequence xn satisfying Qxn ∈ QnX (α, δ), and a realization
of the key k, a reconstruction sequence is chosen uniformly
at random from Ck(xn) (cf. (28)). The associated message is
then given by:
• dlog |QnX |e bits to describe QX .
• dlog |Cnk |e bits to describe the index of the reconstruction.
The legitimate receiver uses the first part of the message
and the key to determine which codebook is being used,
and then uses the second part of the message to recover
the reconstruction Y n. Finally, all sequences xn such that
Qxn /∈ QnX (α, δ) are mapped to an arbitrary message m0.
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Remark 10: One can check that this encoding is feasible
by noting that the required number of bits satisfy:
dlog |QnX |e+ dlog |Cnk |e ≤
|X | log(n+ 1) + 1 + n
(
IQ?
R′ (QX)
(X;Y ) + 
)
+ 2 ≤
n
(
R′ + +
|X |
n
log(n+ 1) +
3
n
)
< nR,
for n large enough. Moreover, it satisfies the excess distortion
probability constraint, since
Pr(d(Xn, Y n) > D) ≤
∑
QX /∈Qn(α,δ)
P (QX)
≤
∑
QX /∈Qn(α,δ)
2−nD(QX ||P )
≤ (n+ 1)|X |2−n(α+δ) < 2−nα,
where the last inequality holds for large enough n.
To analyze the performance of the eavesdropper, note that
when s/he observes a message m 6= m0, then the induced
distribution PXn|M=m is exactly the setup studied in part three
of Lemma 9. Indeed, the message m indicates the type of
the transmitted sequence and the index of the reconstruction
(among 2nr possible codebooks). For m = m0, i.e., for
sequences of type outside Qn(α, δ), the performance can still
be analyzed in light of Lemma 9 by considering the associated
QXY to be of the form QXQY (i.e., X and Y are indepen-
dent), in which case min{Re(QX , De), r +R(QXY , De)} =
min{Re(QX , De), r + Re(QX , De)} = Re(QX , De). Now,
consider the following chain of inequalities.
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, g0(f(X
n,K))
)
≤ De
)
=
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
∑
m∈M
P (xn)Pf (m|xn)·
1 {xn ∈ BDe (g0(m))}
=
∑
QX∈QnX
P (QX)
∑
m∈M
∑
xn∈TQX
Pf (m|TQX )Pf (xn|m,TQX )·
1 {xn ∈ BDe (g0(m))}
=
∑
QX∈QnX
P (QX)
∑
m∈M
Pf (m|TQX )·
max
vn∈Vn
Pf (de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|m,TQX )
(a)
≤
∑
QX∈QnX
P (QX)
∑
m∈M
Pf (m|TQX )·
2−n(min{Re(QX ,De),r+R(Q
?
R′ (QX),De)}−8)
≤
∑
QX∈QnX
2−n(D(QX ||P )+min{Re(QX ,De),r+R(Q
?
R′ (QX),De)}−8)
≤ (n+ 1)|X | max
QX∈QnX
exp
{
− n (D(QX ||P )+
min{Re(QX , De), r +R(Q?R′(QX), De)} − 8)
}
= (n+ 1)|X | exp
(
− nmin
{
min
QX∈QnX (α,δ)
D(QX ||P )+
min{Re(QX , De), r +R(Q?R′(QX), De)},
min
QX /∈QnX (α,δ)
D(QX ||P ) +Re(QX , De)
}
+ 8n
)
= (n+ 1)|X | exp
(
−nmin
{
min
QX∈QnX (α,δ)
D(QX ||P ) + r+
R(Q?R′(QX), De),
min
QX∈QnX
D(QX ||P ) +Re(QX , De)
}
+ 8n
)
, (38)
where (a) follows from (34) of Lemma 9 and the fact that the
codebooks {Ck}2nrk=1 /∈ E˜ by construction. Therefore,
E−(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α)
= lim inf
n→∞ max{fn}
min
{gn}
− 1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn(fn(X
n,K))
)
≤De
)
≥ min
{
E0(P,D),
r + min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α+δ
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,R′, D,De)
}
− 8,
where the inequality follows from the following proposition,
the proof of which is given in Appendix F.
Proposition 10:
lim
n→∞ minQX∈QnX (α,δ)
D(QX ||P ) +R(Q?R′(QX), De) =
min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α+δ
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,R′, D,De).
Now, note that  is arbitrary, and
lim
R′→R
min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α+δ
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,R′, D,De) =
min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α+δ
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,R,D,De), (39)
since R(Q, R˜,D,De) is uniformly continuous in (Q, R˜) over
the set {(Q, R˜) : D(Q||P ) ≤ α + δ,R′ ≤ R˜ ≤ R}
by Proposition 6. Finally, it follows from Proposition 6 and
Proposition 13 (to follow in Appendix A) that
lim
δ→0
min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α+δ
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,R,D,De) =
min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,R,D,De) (40)
As such,
E−(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) ≥ min
{
E0(P,D),
r + min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,R,D,De)
}
.
C. Converse Proof
We now prove that E+(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) ≤ min{r +
minQ:D(Q||P )≤αD(Q||P ) + R(Q,R,D,DE), E0(P,De)}.
We have already shown, following Theorem 1, that the
perfect secrecy exponent E0(P,De) is achievable by the
eavesdropper even in the absence of any observation. It
follows immediately that
E+(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) ≤ E0(P,De). (41)
So we only need to demonstrate a strategy that achieves
the first exponent. The strategy is based on the one suggested
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in Section III-B. We will add an initial stage in which the
eavesdropper tries to guess the value of K, by choosing
an element uniformly at random from {1, 2, · · · , 2nr}. The
eavesdropper’s guess, denoted by K˜, is equal to K with
probability 2−nr (This will correspond to the r term in (25)).
Then, s/he generates Y˜ n = h(M, K˜). Next, the eavesdropper
implements the same stages suggested in Section III-B, where
Y˜ n plays the role of Y n. We denote the strategy by g′.
Remark 11: If h is stochastic, it can be replaced by a
deterministic h that still satisfies the reliability constraint.
Since this does not change the conditional PXn|M , we can
assume, without loss of generality, that h is deterministic.
Now, consider any functions f and h implemented by the
primary user (and satisfying the distortion constraint). Let Pf
denote the induced joint probability of (Xn,M,K), and PK
denote the distribution of K. To analyze the performance
of g′, note that, unlike Section III, not every realization of
Y˜ n necessarily satisfies the distortion constraint. To that end,
define
MD(xn, k) = {m ∈M : d(xn, h(m, k)) ≤ D},
xn ∈ Xn, k ∈ K, (42)
and A = {(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn : d(xn, yn) > D}. (43)
The distortion constraint implies that
Pf (A) ≤ 2−nα. (44)
Moreover, the analysis of g′ should take into account the
rate constraint R. The following Lemma by Weissman and
Ordentlich [30] will be instrumental.
Lemma 11 ( [30, Lemma 3]): Let Y n(.) be an n-block
code of rate ≤ R. Then, for every Q ∈ QnX and η > 0, if
Xn is uniformly distributed over TQ,
Pr
({
xn ∈ TQ : IQxnY n(xn)(X;Y ) > R+ η
}) ≤
(n+ 1)|X ||Y|+|X |2−nη. (45)
Remark 12: This is not the exact statement found in [30],
but it is a straightforward modification.
So, define for every η > 0, xn ∈ Xn, and k ∈ K,
MR(xn, k, η) = {m ∈M : IQxnyn (X;Y ) ≤ R+ η,
where yn = h(m, k)}, (46)
MD,R(xn, k, η) =MD(xn, k) ∩MR(xn, k, η), (47)
and B(η) = {(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn :
IQxnyn (X;Y ) > R+ η
}
. (48)
Finally, fix  > 0, δ > 0 and η > 0, and consider the
following chain of inequalities.
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, g′(f(Xn,K))
)
≤ De
)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈M
P (xn)PK(k)Pf (m|xn, k)·
Pf
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g′(m)
))
≥
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P (xn)PK(k)Pf (m|xn, k)·
Pf
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g′(m)
))
=
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P (xn)PK(k)Pf (m|xn, k)·
∑
k˜∈K
PK
(
K˜ = k˜
)
Pf
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g(h(m, k˜))
))
≥ 2−nr
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P (xn)PK(k)Pf (m|xn, k)·
Pf (x
n ∈ BDe (g(h(m, k))))
(a)
≥ c′n2−nr
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P (xn)PK(k)Pf (m|xn, k)·
2
−nIP?n(Qxnyn )(X;V |Y )
(b)
≥ c′n2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQ
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P (xn)PK(k)·
Pf (m|xn, k) min
QXY ∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y )≤R+η
2−nIP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y )
= c′n2
−nr ∑
QX∈QnX
min
QXY ∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y )≤R+η
2−nIP?n(QXY )(X;V |Y )·
Pf (Ac ∩ Bc(η) ∩ TQ)
(c)
≥ c′n2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX (α,−δ)
min
QXY ∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y )≤R+η
2−n(R(QXY ,De)+)·
Pf (Ac ∩ Bc(η) ∩ TQ)
≥ c′n2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX (α,−δ)
2−n(R(QX ,R+η,D,De)+)·
Pf (Ac ∩ Bc(η) ∩ TQ) (49)
where
(a) follows from Lemma 5 and (42): m ∈ MD(xn, k)
guarantees that d(xn, h(m, k)) ≤ D so that Lemma 5 is
applicable.
(b) follows from (47): m ∈ MD,R(xn, k, η) allows us
to restrict the minimum to QXY ∈ QXY(QX , D)
satisfying IQXY (X;Y ) ≤ R+ η.
(c) follows from Proposition 14 in Appendix B.
Now, note that
Pf (A|TQ) ≤ Pf (A)
P (TQ)
≤ (n+ 1)|X |2−n(α−D(Q||P )). (50)
Moreover, by Lemma 11,
Pf (B(η)|TQ) ≤ (n+ 1)|X ||Y|+|X |2−nη. (51)
Combining (50) and (51) yields, for every QX ∈ QnX (α,−δ),
Pf (Ac ∩ Bc(η) ∩ TQ)
= P (TQ)Pf (Ac ∩ Bc(η)|TQ)
≥ P (TQ)(1− Pf (A|TQ)− Pf (B(η)|TQ))
≥ P (TQ)(1− (n+ 1)|X |2−nδ − (n+ 1)|X ||Y|+|X |2−nη)
≥ P (TQ)/2, (52)
where the last inequality holds for large enough n. Continuing
from (49), we get
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, g′(f(Xn,K))
)
≤ De
)
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≥ (c′n/2)2−nr(n+ 1)−|X|·∑
QX∈QnX (α,−δ)
2−n(D(QX ||P )+R(QX ,R+η,D,De)+)
≥ (c′n/2)(n+ 1)−|X| exp
{
− n
(
+ r+
min
QX∈QnX (α,−δ)
D(QX ||P ) +R(QX , R+ η,D,De)
)}
.
(53)
Therefore, taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting
that , δ, and η are arbitrary, we get
E+(P,
−→
D,
−→
R,α) =
lim sup
n→∞
max
{fn}
min
{gn}
− 1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn(fn(X
n,K))
)
≤De
)
≤ lim
δ→0
lim
η→0
r + min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α−δ
D(Q||P )+R(Q,R+ η,D,De)
= r + min
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
D(Q||P ) +R(Q,R,D,De), (54)
where the last equality follows similarly to equations (39)
and (40). Combining (41) and (54) yields our result.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
A. Proof of Property (P1)
(P1): For fixed PXY , R(PXY , De) is a finite valued, non-
increasing convex function of De. Furthermore, R(PXY , De)
is a uniformly continuous function of the pair (PXY , De).
Fix PXY . The minimization in (4) is over a compact
set, which is non-empty due to assumption (A3). Since
I(X;V |Y ) is a continuous function of PV |X,Y , the minimum
is achieved. The monotonicity in De follows directly from
the definition. It is easy to check that I(X;V |Y ) is convex
in PV |X,Y for fixed PXY . Then, the proof of the convexity
of R(PXY , De) in De follows similarly to the case of the
rate-distortion function with no side information (see Lemma
2.2.2 in [28]).
To show the uniform continuity in the pair (PXY , De),
consider the following proposition, the proof of which is given
in Appendix G-A.
Proposition 12: Let N1 and N2 be in N, and let S and
U be compact subsets of RN1 and RN2 , respectively. Let ν
be a non-negative continuous function defined on S × U , and
let ϑ be a real-valued continuous function defined on S × U .
Suppose they satisfy the following condition:
(PA) If (s, u1) ∈ S×U satisfies ν(s, u1) = minu′∈U ν(s, u′),
then there exists u2 such that ϑ(s, u2) = ϑ(s, u1), and
for all s′ ∈ S, ν(s′, u2) = minu′∈U ν(s′, u′).
Let t0 = maxs∈S minu∈U ν(s, u), and let ϕ be a function on
S × [t0,+∞) defined as follows:
ϕ(s, t) = min
u:ν(s,u)≤t
ϑ(s, u).
If for fixed s ∈ S, ϕ(s, t) is continuous in t, then ϕ(s, t) is
continuous in the pair (s, t).
Remark 13: The proposition generalizes Lemma 2.2.2
in [28], which shows the continuity of the regular rate-
distortion function, and the proof follows along similar lines.
The proposition yields immediately the continuity of
R(PXY , De) by identifying S with PXY , U with the
set of conditional probability distributions PV |XY , t0 with
De,min, and the functions ν, ϑ, and ϕ with E[de(X,V )],
I(X;V |Y ), and R(PXY , De) respectively. It is easy to
check that De,min = maxPXY minPV |XY E[de(X,V )]
so that we can identify it with t0. To see why
E[de(X,V )] and I(X;V |Y ) satisfy (PA), note the follow-
ing. For notational convenience, we write E[de(X,V )] as
de(PXY , PV |XY ), and I(X;V |Y ) as I(PXY , PV |XY ). Sup-
pose de(PXY , PV |XY ) = minPˆV |XY de(PXY , PˆV |XY ) and let
De(x) = minv∈V de(x, v) for x ∈ X . Then for all (x, v)
such that de(x, v) > De(x), PXV (x, v) = 0. Expanding
PXV (x, v):
PXV (x, v) =
∑
y PXY (x, y)PV |XY (v|x, y) = 0 ⇒ for all
y ∈ Y , PXY (x, y) = 0 or PV |XY (v|x, y) = 0. Then, define
P ′V |XY as follows:
• If PXY (x, y) > 0, let P ′V |(X=x,Y=y) = PV |(X=x,Y=y).
• If PXY (x, y) = 0, let P ′V |(X=x,Y=y) satisfy
P ′V |(X=x,Y=y)(v|x, y) = 0 if de(x, v) > De(x).
Then PXY PV |X,Y = PXY P ′V |X,Y , thus I(PXY , PV |XY ) =
I(PXY , P
′
V |XY ). Moreover, the definition of P
′
V |XY guaran-
tees that de(x, v) > De(x) ⇒ P ′V |XY (v|x, y) = 0 for all y.
Therefore, for any joint distribution P ′XY , de(P
′
XY , P
′
V |XY ) =
minPˆV |XY de(PXY , PˆV |XY ).
Finally, to prove uniform continuity, note that
R(PXY , De) = R(PXY , De,max) for all De ≥ De,max.
Therefore, R(PXY , De) is uniformly continuous on the set
PXY × [De,max,∞). Since it is also uniformly continuous on
PXY × [De,min, De,max], the result is established. 
B. Proof of Property (P2)
(P2): For fixed PX , R(PX , D,De) is a finite-valued func-
tion of (D,De). Moreover, for fixed De, R(PX , D,De) is a
uniformly continuous function of the pair (PX , D).
Fix PX . The maximization in (5) is over a compact
set, which is non-empty due to assumption (A3). Since
R(PXY , De) is a continuous function of PXY , it is also
continuous in PY |X for fixed PX . Therefore, the maximum
is achieved.
As for the continuity in (PX , D) for fixed De, we view
R(PX , D,De) as a function of (PX , D), and R(PXY , De) as
function of (PX , PY |X). In the terminology of Proposition 12,
we identify S with PX , U with the set of conditional proba-
bility distributions PY |X , t0 with Dmin, and the functions ν, ϑ,
and ϕ with E[d(X,Y )], −R(PXY , De), and −R(PX , D,De)
respectively. Proving that E[d(X,Y )] and R(PXY , De) satisfy
(PA) follows along the same lines as proving E[de(X,V )]
and I(X;V |Y ) satisfy (PA) . Moreover, if continuity holds,
uniform continuity follows from the fact that R(PX , D,De)
is constant for all D ≥ Dmax.
It remains to show that R(PX , D,De) is a continuous func-
tion of D for fixed PX and De. The result of Proposition 12
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then applies immediately. To this end, consider the following
proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix G-B
Proposition 13: Let N be in N, and let T be a non-empty
compact subset of RN . Let L be a real-valued continuous
function defined on T . Let T1 ⊇ T2 ⊇ · · · be a decreasing se-
quence of non-empty compact subsets of T . Let T = ⋂i≥1 Ti.
Then,
lim
k→∞
max
t∈Tk
L(t) = max
t∈T
L(t).
Moreover, let S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ · · · be an increasing sequence of
non-empty compact subsets of T . Let S = ⋃i≥1 Si (where
the bar denotes closure of the set). Then
lim
k→∞
max
t∈Sk
L(t) = max
t∈S
L(t).
Consequently, if T is also convex, and Lc is a real-valued
convex and continuous function defined on T with s0 =
mint∈T Lc(t), then
Lˆ(s) := max
t:Lc(t)≤s
L(t)
is continuous in s ∈ [s0,+∞).
It follows immediately then that R(PX , D,De) is continu-
ous in D for fixed PX and De, since E[d(X,Y )] is convex
and continuous in PY |X , and R(PXY , De) is continuous in
PY |X (for fixed PX ).
C. Proof of Property (P3)
(P3): Re(PX , De) − R(PX , D) ≤ R(PX , D,De) ≤
Re(PX , De).
The upper bound is straightforward since R(PXY , De),
the rate-distortion function with side information, is always
upper-bounded by Re(PX , De). The lower bound is derived
by considering a conditional P ?Y |X that achieves the rate-
distortion function.
R(PX , D,De)
= max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y )]≤D
min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V )]≤De
I(X;V |Y )
≥ min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V )]≤De
HP?XY (X|Y )−HP?XY PV |XY (X|V, Y ) (55)
≥ min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V )]≤De
HP?XY (X|Y )−HPXPV |X (X|V ) (56)
= −HPX (X) +HP?XY (X|Y )+
min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V )]≤De
HPX (X)−HPXPV |X (X|V )
= −R(PX , D) +Re(PX , De).
APPENDIX B
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First, consider the following proposition.
Proposition 14: For all  > 0, there exists
n2(, |X |, |Y|, |V|), such that for all n ≥ n2, for all
De ≥ De,min, for each QXY ∈ QnXY ,∣∣∣ min
PXY V ∈
QnXY V (QXY ,De)
IPXY V (X;V |Y )−R(QXY , De)
∣∣∣ ≤ .
Proof: It follows directly from the definition that
min
PXY V ∈
Qn(QXY ,De)
IPXY V (X;V |Y ) ≥ R(QXY , De).
So, we only need to show the other direction. To that end, let
δ > 0 be small enough such that
‖PXY V − P ′XY V ‖ ≤ δ ⇒∣∣IPXY V (X;V |Y )− IP ′XY V (X;V |Y )∣∣ ≤ , (57)
where ‖ · ‖ is used to indicate the L2-norm. Let n ≥
n2 ≥ |V|
√|X ||Y||V|/δ. Fix QXY ∈ QnXY , and let P ?V |XY
be the conditional distribution achieving the minimum in
R(QXY , De). We construct a conditional distribution P ′V |XY
as follows. For each (x, y) ∈ X × Y , we will choose
P ′V |X=x,Y=y from QnQXY (x,y)V , i.e., the set of rational PMFs
over V with denominator nQXY (x, y) (if QXY (x, y) =
0, then we can choose P ′V |X=x,Y=y to be any distribu-
tion). This guarantees that QXY P ′V |XY is in QnXYV . Let
v(x) = argminv∈V de(x, v) for x ∈ X (if more than
one v achieves the minimum, choose one arbitrarily). We
construct P ′V |XY by rounding P
?
V |XY as follows. For each
(x, y) ∈ X × V , for v 6= v(x), we set P ′V |XY (v|x, y)
to be the largest integer multiple of 1/(nQXY (x, y)) that
is smaller than P ?V |XY (v|x, y), i.e., we round down with
resolution 1/(nQXY (x, y)) and denote this operation by
b.cnQXY (x,y). Finally, we set P ′V |XY (v(x)|x, y) appropriately
to make P ′V |XY (.|x, y) a valid probability distribution. It is
easy to see that, for such a choice,∣∣∣P ′V |XY (v|x, y)− P ?V |XY (v|x, y)∣∣∣ ≤ |V|nQXY (x, y) .
Moreover, this readily implies that∥∥∥QXY P ′V |XY −QXY P ?V |XY ∥∥∥ ≤ |V|√|X ||Y||V|n ≤ δ.
(58)
Let P ?XY V = QXY P
?
V |XY , and P
′
XY V = QXY P
′
V |XY . Now,
note that
De ≥ EP?XY V [de(X,V )]
=
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY (x, y)P
?
V |XY (v|x, y)de(x, v)
=
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY (x, y)bP ?V |XY (v|x, y)cnQXY (x,y)de(x, v)
+
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY (x, y)·(
P ?V |XY (v|x, y)− bP ?V |XY (v|x, y)cnQXY (x,y)
)
de(x, v)
≥
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY (x, y)bP ?V |XY (v|x, y)cnQXY (x,y)de(x, v)
+
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY (x, y)·(
P ?V |XY (v|x, y)− bP ?V |XY (v|x, y)cnQXY (x,y)
)
de(x, v(x))
= EP ′XY V [de(X,V )].
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Therefore,
min
PXY V ∈
Qn(QXY ,De)
IPXY V (X;V |Y ) ≤ IP ′XY V (X;V |Y )
≤ IP?XY V (X;V |Y ) + 
= R(QXY , De) + ,
where the second inequality follows from (57) and (58).
Similarly, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 15: For all  > 0, there exists
n3(, |X |, |Y|, de), such that for all n ≥ n3, D ≥ Dmin,
De ≥ De,min, and for each QX ∈ QnX ,∣∣∣ max
PXY ∈
QnXY (QX ,D)
R(QXY , De)−R(QX , D,De)
∣∣∣ ≤ .
The proof follows along the same lines as that of
Proposition 14, and is thus omitted. 
By the previous two propositions, for any given  > 0, we
can set n large enough to satisfy∣∣IP?n(QX)(X;V |Y )−R(QX , D,De)∣∣ ≤ ,
for all QX ∈ QnX . Therefore,
min
QX∈QnX
D(QX ||P ) +R(QX , D,De)−  ≤
min
QX∈QnX
D(QX ||P ) + IP?n(QX)(X;V |Y ) ≤
min
QX∈QnX
D(QX ||P ) +R(QX , D,De) + 
By taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that  is
arbitrary, the proof is concluded.
APPENDIX C
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A. Proof of Property (P4)
(P4): For fixed PX , R(PX , R,D,De) is a
finite-valued function of (R,D,De). Moreover,
for fixed De, R(PX , R,D,De) is continuous
in the triple (PX , R,D) over the set S =
{(PX , R,D) : PX ∈ PX , D ≥ Dmin, R > R(PX , D)}.
Recall, for PX satisfying R(PX , D) ≤ R,
R(PX , R,D,De) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y )]≤D
I(X;Y )≤R
R(PXY , De).
For fixed PX , let SD,R ={
PY |X : E[d(X,Y )] ≤ D, I(X;Y ) ≤ R
}
. Then SD,R
is compact, and non-empty since D ≥ Dmin and
R ≥ R(PX , D). Since R(PXY , De) is a continuous
function of PXY (by Proposition 1), it is also continuous in
PY |X for fixed PX . Therefore, the maximum is achieved.
To prove continuity of R(PX , R,D,De) in (PX , R,D),
first consider the following claims.
Claim 1: For fixed PX , De, and D, R(PX , R,D,De) is
continuous in R, where R ∈ [R(PX , D),+∞).
This follows from the third part of Proposition 13 in
Appendix A by identifying T with {PY |X : E[d(X,Y )] ≤ D}
(which is compact, convex, and non-empty since D ≥ Dmin),
Lc with I(X;Y ) which is convex and continuous in PY |X ,
s0 with R(PX , D), L with R(PXPY |X , De), and Lˆ with
R(PX , R,D,De).
Claim 2: For fixed PX , De, and R, R(PX , R,D,De)
is continuous in D, where D ∈ [D(PX , R),+∞) and
D(PX , R) := minPY |X :I(X;Y )≤RE[d(X,Y )] is the distortion-
rate function.
This follows from a similar argument.
We are now ready to prove continu-
ity in the triple (PX , R,D) over S =
{(PX , R,D) : PX ∈ PX , D ≥ Dmin, R > R(PX , D)}.
To that end, fix any (P,R,D) ∈ S and consider any
sequence (Pk, Rk, Dk) converging to (P,R,D). First, we
show that lim infk→∞R(Pk, Rk, Dk, De) ≥ R(P,R,D,De).
Consider any  > 0. By continuity of R(P,R,D,De) in R (for
fixed P , D, and De), we can choose R′ such that R(PX , D) <
R′ < R and R(P,R′, D,De) ≥ R(P,R,D,De) − /2. We
now consider two cases depending on the value of D. Let
D0 = minPY |X E[d(X,Y )].
If D > D0: note that D(P,R) is non-increasing in R, there-
fore D′(P,R) ≤ 0. Moreover, it is convex in R and R(P,D)
does not achieve its minimum (D(P,R(P,D)) = D > D0),
hence D′(P,R(P,D)) < 0. Therefore, R > R(P,D) ⇒
D(P,R) < D. Now choose D′ such that D(P,R) < D′ < D
and R(P,R′, D′, De) ≥ R(P,R′, D,De)− /2. Let P ?Y |X be
a maximizer for R(P,R′, D′, De).
If D = D0: set D′ = D and P ′Y |X be a maximizer for
R(P,R′, D,De). Let D(x) = miny∈Y d(x, y) for x ∈ X .
Then P ′Y |X must satisfy the following property: for all (x, y)
such that d(x, y) > D(x), P (x) = 0 or P ′Y |X(y|x) = 0.
We can construct P ?Y |X such that d(x, y) > D(x) ⇒
P ?Y |X(y|x) = 0, and P (x) > 0 ⇒ P ?Y |X=x = P ′Y |X=x. As
such, PP ′Y |X = PP
?
Y |X .
We claim that P ?Y |X is feasible for the maximiza-
tion in R(Pk, Rk, Dk, De) for sufficiently large k. Indeed,
I(Pk;P
?
Y |X) → I(P ;P ?Y |X) ≤ R′ < R. Then for sufficiently
large k, I(P ;P ?Y |X) ≤ Rk. Moreover, if D > D0, then
E[d(Pk, P
?
Y |X)]→ E[d(P, P ?Y |X)] ≤ D′ < D. Then for suffi-
ciently large k, E[d(Pk, P ?Y |X)] ≤ Dk. Similarly, if D = D0,
then E[d(Pk, P ?Y |X)] = minPY |X E[d(Pk, PY |X)] ≤ Dmin ≤
Dk, where the first equality follows from the construction of
P ?Y |X . So we get
lim inf
k→∞
R(Pk, Rk, Dk, De) ≥ lim inf
k→∞
R(PkP
?
Y |X , De)
= R(PP ?Y |X , De)
= R(P,R′, D′, De)
≥ R(P,R,D,De)− ,
where the first equality follows from the continuity of
R(PXY , De) in PXY . Noting that  is arbitrary, we get our
first inequality.
On the other hand, let P (k)Y |X be a maximizer for
R(Pk, Rk, Dk, De). Consider a sequence of integers {kj} such
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that
R(Pkj , Rkj , Dkj , De)→ lim sup
k→∞
R(Pk, Rk, Dk, De).
Let P (kj)Y |X be the corresponding subsequence of
maximizers. Since the set of conditional distributions
{PY |X} is bounded, {P (kj)Y |X} has a convergent
subsequence P
(kj` )
Y |X . Let P
?
Y |X be its limit. We have,
I(P ;P ?Y |X) = lim`→∞ I(P ;P
(kj` )
Y |X ) ≤ lim`→∞Rkj` = R.
Similarly, E[d(P, P ?Y |X)] = lim`→∞E[d(P, P
(kj` )
Y |X )] ≤
lim`→∞Dkj` = D. Therefore,
R(P,R,D,De) ≥ R(PP ?Y |X , De)
= lim
`→∞
R(Pkj`P
kj`
Y |X , De)
= lim
`→∞
R(Pkj` , Rkj` , Dkj` , De)
= lim sup
k→∞
R(Pk, Rk, Dk, De).
B. Proof of Property (P5)
(P5): Re(PX , De) − R(PX , D) ≤ R(PX , R,D,De) ≤
R(PX , D,De) ≤ Re(PX , De).
The upper bound follows straightforwardly from the defini-
tion and (P3). The lower bound follows from the proof of (P3).
Indeed, the bound in (P3) was derived by considering a condi-
tional P ?Y |X that achieves the rate-distortion function. As such,
this choice is feasible since IP?XY (X;Y ) = R(PX , D) ≤ R.
APPENDIX D
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Note that the second equality follows simply from the
evaluation of Re(Q,De)−R(Q,D). So we only need to show
the first equality.
Note that (P3) asserts that R(Q,D,De) ≥ Re(Q,De) −
R(Q,D), so we only need to show the reverse direction.
Moreover, if H(Q) ≤ H(D), R(Q,D) = 0. It then follows
from (P3) that R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De). It remains to show
that, for Q satisfying H(Q) ≥ H(D),
R(Q,D,De) ≤ Re(Q,De)−R(Q,D).
Remark 14: The following proof was suggested by the
reviewer, and it significantly simplifies our previous proof.
To that end, let PY |X satisfy E[d(X,Y )] ≤ D, X˜ = X ⊕ Y ,
V˜ = V ⊕ Y and consider
min
PV |XY :E[d(X,V )]≤De
I(X;V |Y )
= min
PV |XY :E[d(X⊕Y,V⊕Y )]≤De
I(X ⊕ Y ;V ⊕ Y |Y )
= min
PV˜ |X˜Y :E[d(X˜,V˜ )]≤De
I(X˜; V˜ |Y )
≤ min
PV˜ |X˜ :E[d(X˜,V˜ )]≤De
V−X−Y
I(X˜; V˜ |Y )
≤ min
PV˜ |X˜ :E[d(X˜,V˜ )]≤De
I(X˜; V˜ )
= [H(X˜)−H(De)]+
(a)
≤ H(D)−H(De),
where (a) follows from the fact that Pr(X˜ = 1) =
E[d(X,Y )] ≤ D. Therefore,
R(Q,D,De) = max
PY |X :E[d(X,Y )]≤D
min
PV |XY :
E[d(X,V )]≤De
I(X;V |Y )
≤ H(D)−H(De) = Re(Q,De)−R(Q,D),
as desired. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 9
Proof of 1): For xn ∈ TQX , and m ∈ [N ], let
Nxn,m = I{(xn, Y nm) ∈ TQXY }, so that Nxn =
N∑
m=1
Nxn,m.
Note that, Nxn,m ∼ Ber(β), where
β = Pr((xn, Y nm) ∈ TQXY ) =
|TQY |X (xn)|
|TQY |
,
⇒ 2−n(IQXY (X;Y )+/2) ≤ β ≤ 2−n(IQXY (X;Y )−/2). (59)
Therefore,
Pr(Nxn = 0) = Pr(Nxn,m = 0,∀m ∈ [N ])
(a)
=
N∏
m=1
(1− β)
(b)
≤ e−βN ≤ e−2n/6 , (60)
where (a) follows from the independence of Nxn,m for differ-
ent m’s, and (b) follows from the fact that (1− t)N ≤ e−tN .
On the other hand,
Pr(Nxn > 2
2n) = Pr
(
N∑
m=1
Nxn,m > 2
2n
)
(a)
≤
(
eNβ
22n
)22n
≤ (e2−n/2)22n , (61)
where (a) follows from the Chernoff bound (cf. [25, Lemma
2]). Using equations (60) and (61) and the union bound, we
get
Pr(E) ≤ |X |n
(
(e2−n/2)2
2n
+ e−2
n/6
)
≤ e−2n/7 ,
establishing (31). 
Proof of 2): To show that (32) holds, consider Cn /∈ E , and
(xn,m) where m ∈ C(xn),
P CXn|M (x
n|m) =
P CM |Xn(m|xn)∑
xn∈TQX|Y (ynm) P
C
M |Xn(m|xn)
≤ 1
2n(HQXY (X|Y )−)2−2n
= 2−n(HQXY (X|Y )−3). (62)
Then,
Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cn)
=
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
P CXn|M (x
n|m)
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≤
∑
xn:de(x
n,vn)≤De
(xn,ynm)∈TQXY
2−n(HQXY (X|Y )−3)
(a)
≤ max
PXY V ∈Qn(QXY ,De)
2n(HPXY V (X|V,Y )+)2−n(HQXY (X|Y )−3)
= max
PXY V ∈Qn(QXY ,De)
2−n(IPXY V (X;V |Y )−4)
≤ 2−n(R(QXY ,De)−4), (63)
where (a) follows from (12). It remains to show (33). To that
end, note that, given yn ∈ Yn and m ∈ [N ],
Pr(Y nm = y
n|Ec) ≤ Pr(Y
n
m = y
n)
Pr(Ec)
≤ 2
−n(HQY (Y )−/2)
1− e−2n/7 ≤ 2
−n(HQY (Y )−).
Therefore,
E[Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cn)|Ec]
=
∑
Cn∈Ec
Pr(Cn|Ec)Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cn)
=
∑
yn∈Yn
∑
Cn∈Ec
Pr(Y nm = y
n|Ec)Pr(Cn|Y nm = yn, Ec)·
Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cn)
=
∑
yn∈Yn
∑
Cn∈Ec
Pr(Y nm = y
n|Ec)Pr(Cn|Y nm = yn, Ec)·∑
xn:de(x
n,vn)≤De
(xn,yn)∈TQXY
P CXn|M (x
n|m)
(a)
≤
∑
yn∈Yn
∑
Cn∈Ec
Pr(Y nm = y
n|Ec)Pr(Cn|Y nm = yn, Ec)·∑
xn:de(x
n,vn)≤De
(xn,yn)∈TQXY
2−n(HQXY (X|Y )−3)
=
∑
yn∈Yn
Pr(Y nm = y
n|Ec)
∑
xn:de(x
n,vn)≤De
(xn,yn)∈TQXY
2−n(HQXY (X|Y )−3)
=
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
∑
yn∈TQY |X (xn)
Pr(Y nm = y
n|Ec)·
2−n(HQXY (X|Y )−3)
≤
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
∑
yn∈TQY |X (xn)
2−n(HQY (Y )−/2)·
2−n(HQXY (X|Y )−3)
≤
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
2nHQXY (Y |X)2−n(HQXY (X,Y )−7/2)
=
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
2−n(HQX (X)−7/2)
(b)
≤ max
PXV ∈QnXV
2n(HPXV (X|V )+/2)2−n(HQX (X)−7/2)
≤ 2−n(Re(QX ,De)−4),
where (a) follows from (62), and (b) can be shown analogously
to (12). 
Proof of 3): For notational convenience, let E =
min{Re(QX , De), r +R(QXY , De)}. Note that,
Pr(E˜) ≤ Pr
(
2nr⋃
k=1
Ek
)
+Pr
E˜∣∣∣∣
(
2nr⋃
k=1
Ek
)c
≤ e−2n/8 +Pr
(
E˜
∣∣∣∣ 2
nr⋂
k=1
Eck
)
, (64)
where the second inequality follows from the union bound
and (31). Now, fix {Cnk }2
nr
k=1 ∈ ∩2
nr
k=1Eck, m ∈ [N ], and vn ∈
Vn, and suppose K = k0. Then,
Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m,K = k0, {Cnk }2
nr
k=1)
= Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cnk0)
≤ 2−n(R(QXY ,De)−4), (65)
where the inequality follows from (32). Furthermore,
E
[
Pr(de(X
n, vn)≤De|M= m,K= k0, {Cnk }2
nr
k=1)
∣∣∣∣∣
2nr⋂
k=1
Eck
]
= E
[
Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cnk0)
∣∣∣∣∣
2nr⋂
k=1
Eck
]
= E
[
Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cnk0)|Eck0
]
≤ 2−n(Re(QX ,De)−4), (66)
where the last inequality follows from (33). Now, consider
{Cnk }2
nr
k=1 ∈
(∪2nrk=1Ek)c.
Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, {Cnk }2
nr
k=1)
=
2nr∑
j=1
Pr(K = j|M = m, {Cnk }2
nr
k=1)·
Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m,K = j, {Cnk }2
nr
k=1)
≤
2nr∑
j=1
2−n(r−2)Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cnj ), (67)
where the inequality follows from:
Pr(K = j|M = m, {Cnk }2
nr
k=1)
=
Pr(K = j)Pr(M = m|K = j, {Cnk }2
nr
k=1)∑2nr
`=1Pr(K = `)Pr(M = m|K = `, {Cnk }2nrk=1)
=
Pr(M = m|K = j, Cnj )∑2nr
`=1Pr(M = m|K = `, Cn` )
=
∑
xn:
m∈Cj(xn)
Pr(Xn= xn)Pr(M= m|Xn= xn,K= j, Cnj )
2nr∑`
=1
∑
xn:
m∈C`(xn)
Pr(Xn= xn)Pr(M= m|Xn= xn,K= `, Cn` )
(a)
≤
∑
xn:m∈Cj(xn) 1∑2nr
`=1
∑
xn:m∈C`(xn) 2
−2n
(b)
= 2−n(r−2)
where (a) follows from the fact that 1 ≤ Nxn ≤
22n, and (b) follows from the fact that, for any
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j,
∑
xn:m∈Cj(xn) 1 = |{xn : (xn, ynm(Cj)) ∈ TQXY }| =|TQX|Y (ynm(Cj))| = |TQX|Y (yn)| for any yn ∈ TQY .
Given
(∪2nrk=1Ek)c, the terms in the summands of (67) are
independent and identically distributed random variables, with
an upper bound given by (65), and an expectation upper-
bounded by (66). It follows from Chernoff’s bound [25,
Corollary 2] that
Pr
(
Pr(de(X
n,vn)≤De|M=m,{Cnk }2
nr
k=1)>2
−n(E−8)
∣∣∣∣∣
2nr⋂
k=1
Eck
)
= Pr
2nr∑
j=1
2−n(r−2)Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cnj ) >
2−n(E−8)
∣∣∣∣∣
2nr⋂
k=1
Eck
)
= Pr
2nr∑
j=1
Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m, Cnj ) >
2−n(E−r−6)
∣∣∣∣∣
2nr⋂
k=1
Eck
)
≤
(
e2nr2−n(Re(QX ,De)−4)
2−n(E−r−6)
) 2−n(E−r−6)
2−n(R(QXY ,De)−4)
≤
(
e2−n(Re(QX ,De)−E−4+6)
)2−n(E−r−R(QXY ,De)−6+4)
≤ 2−n22n , (68)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
Re(QX , De)−E ≥ 0, and E− r−R(QXY , De) ≤ 0. By the
union bound,
Pr
(
E˜
∣∣∣∣∣
2nr⋂
k=1
Eck
)
≤ N2−n22n
≤ 2n(IQXY (X;Y )+−22n)
≤ 2n(log |X |+−22n) ≤ 2− 2n22n . (69)
Combining (64) and (69) yields
Pr
(
E˜
)
≤ e−2n/8 + 2− 2n22n ≤ e−2n/9 , (70)
as desired. 
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10
Consider the following proposition.
Proposition 16: Given  > 0, β > 0, and
R′ > maxQ:D(Q||P )≤β R(Q,D) =: Rβ , there exists
n4(, |X |, |Y|, R′, de) such that for all n ≥ n4, D ≥ Dmin,
De ≥ De,min, and for each QX ∈ QnX (β, 0) (cf. (36)) ,∣∣∣ max
QXY ∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y )≤R′
R(QXY , De)−R(QX , R′, D,De)
∣∣∣ ≤ .
Proof: Note that Proposition 15 is a special case in which
β = +∞ and R ≥ maxQR(Q,D). As such, the proof follows
along similar lines as Propositions 15 and 14, but must account
for the rate constraint R.
It follows directly from the definition that
max
QXY ∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y )≤R′
R(QXY , De) ≤ R(QX , R′, D,De).
So, we only need to show the reverse direction. To that end,
choose R′′ such that Rβ < R′′ < R′. By Proposition 6,
R(QX , R,D,De) is uniformly continuous in (QX , R) over
the set {(QX , R) : D(QX ||P ) ≤ β,R′′ ≤ R ≤ R′}. Then let
δ1 > 0 be small enough such that, for all QX ∈ QnX (β, 0),
|R(QX , R′ − δ1, D,De)−R(QX , R′, D,De)| ≤ /2. (71)
Let δ2 > 0 be small enough such that
‖PXY − P ′XY ‖ ≤ δ2⇒|R(PXY , De)−R(P ′XY , De)| ≤/2
and |IPXY (X;Y )− IP ′XY (X;Y )| ≤ δ1.
(72)
Let n ≥ n4 ≥ |Y|
√|X |/δ2. Fix QX ∈ QnX (β, 0) and let
P ?Y |X be the conditional distribution achieving the maximum
in R(QX , R′ − δ1, D,De). We construct P ′Y |X by rounding
the values of P ?Y |X , as done in Proposition 14. Similarly to
Proposition 14, this guarantees that QXP ′Y |X ∈ QnXY ,
‖QXP ′Y |X −QXP ?Y |X‖≤ δ2, and EQXP ′Y |X [d(X,Y )] ≤D.
(73)
Moreover, it follows from (72) and (73) that IQXP ′XY (X;Y ) ≤
IQXP?XY (X;Y ) + δ1 ≤ R′. Therefore,
max
QXY ∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y )≤R′
R(QXY , De) ≥ R(QXP ′Y |X , De)
≥ R(QXP ?Y |X , De)− /2
≥ R(QX , R′, D,De)− ,
where the second inequality follows from (72) and (73), and
the third inequality from (71).
The proposition yields
min
QX∈QnX (β,0)
D(QX ||P ) +R(Q,R′, D,De)− 
≤ min
QX∈QnX (β,0)
D(QX ||P ) +R(Q?R′(QX), De)
≤ min
QX∈QnX (β,0)
D(QX ||P ) +R(Q,R′, D,De).
By taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that  is
arbitrary, the proof is concluded.
APPENDIX G
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 12 AND 13
A. Proof of Proposition 12
We restate the proposition.
Proposition 12: Let N1 and N2 be in N, and let S and
U be compact subsets of RN1 and RN2 , respectively. Let ν
be a non-negative continuous function defined on S × U , and
let ϑ be a real-valued continuous function defined on S × U .
Suppose they satisfy the following condition:
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(PA) If (s, u1) ∈ S×U satisfies ν(s, u1) = minu′∈U ν(s, u′),
then there exists u2 such that ϑ(s, u2) = ϑ(s, u1), and
for all s′ ∈ S, ν(s′, u2) = minu′∈U ν(s′, u′).
Let t0 = maxs∈S minu∈U ν(s, u), and let ϕ be a function on
S × [t0,+∞) defined as follows:
ϕ(s, t) = min
u:ν(s,u)≤t
ϑ(s, u).
If for fixed s ∈ S , ϕ(s, t) is continuous in t, then ϕ(s, t) is
continuous in the pair (s, t).
First, note that, for all s ∈ S and all t ≥ t0, ν−1 (s, [0, t]) ,
{u : ν(s, u) ≤ t} is closed by continuity of ν, so it is compact
since it is also bounded. Moreover it is non-empty since t ≥ t0.
Since ϑ is continuous and the minimization is over a compact
set, ϕ is well defined.
Now fix (s, t) ∈ S × [t0,+∞), and consider any sequence
(sk, tk) → (s, t). Let ts = minu∈U ν(s, u) and consider any
 > 0.
If t > ts:
By continuity of ϕ(s, t) as a function of t for fixed s, there
exists δ > 0 such that |t− t′| ≤ δ ⇒ |ϕ(s, t)− ϕ(s, t′)| ≤ .
Let t′ = t − min{δ/2, (t − ts)/2}, and let
u′ ∈ argminu:ν(s,u)≤t′ ϑ(s, u). Then, ν(s, u′) < t and
ϕ(s, t′) = ϑ(s, u′) ≤ ϕ(s, t) + .
If t = ts:
Let u′ be a minimizer for ϕ(s, ts) satisfying ν(s′, u′) = ts′
for all s′ ∈ S. Such choice is possible by assumption (PA).
Note that ϑ(s, u′) = ϕ(s, ts).
We claim that the choice of u′ is feasible for the min-
imization in ϕ(sk, tk), i.e., ν(sk, u′) ≤ tk for sufficiently
large k. Indeed, if t > ts, ν(sk, u′) → ν(s, u′) = t′ < t,
then for sufficiently large k, ν(sk, u′) ≤ tk. If t = ts, then
ν(sk, u
′) = tsk ≤ t0 ≤ tk.
Moreover, by continuity of ϑ, ϑ(sk, u′) → ϑ(s, u′). Then,
for sufficiently large k, ϑ(sk, u′) ≤ ϕ(s, t) + /2. So, we get
lim sup
k→∞
ϕ(sk, tk) ≤ lim sup
k→∞
ϑ(sk, u
′) ≤ ϕ(s, t).
On the other hand, let uk be a minimizer for ϕ(sk, tk).
Consider a sequence of integers {kj} such that
ϕ(skj , tkj )→ lim inf
k→∞
ϕ(sk, tk).
Let {ukj} be the corresponding subsequence of minimizers.
Since U is a bounded set, then {ukj} has a convergent
subsequence {ukj`}. Let u′ be its limit. By continuity of ν,
we have ν(s, u′) = lim`→∞ ν(skj` , ukj` ) ≤ lim`→∞ tkj` = t.
Therefore,
ϕ(s, t) ≤ ϑ(s, u′) = lim
`→∞
ϑ(skj` , ukj` )
= lim
`→∞
ϕ(skj` , tkj` )
= lim inf
k→∞
ϕ(sk, tk).

B. Proof of Proposition 13
We restate the proposition.
Proposition 13: Let N be in N, and let T be a non-empty
compact subset of RN . Let L be a real-valued continuous
function defined on T . Let T1 ⊇ T2 ⊇ · · · be a decreasing se-
quence of non-empty compact subsets of T . Let T = ⋂i≥1 Ti.
Then,
lim
k→∞
max
t∈Tk
L(t) = max
t∈T
L(t).
Moreover, let S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ · · · be an increasing sequence of
non-empty compact subsets of T . Let S = ⋃i≥1 Si (where
the bar denotes closure of the set). Then,
lim
k→∞
max
t∈Sk
L(t) = max
t∈S
L(t).
Consequently, if T is also convex, and Lc is a real-valued
convex and continuous function defined on T with s0 =
mint∈T Lc(t), then
Lˆ(s) := max
t:Lc(t)≤s
L(t)
is continuous in s ∈ [s0,+∞).
First, note that T is non-empty and compact since a count-
able intersection of non-empty decreasing compact sets is non-
empty and compact. Let
tk = argmax
t∈Tk
L(t) and t? = argmax
t∈T
L(t).
We need to show that L(tk)→ L(t?). Let Bδ(t) = {t′ ∈ T :
‖t′ − t‖ < δ}, and consider the following claim.
Claim 1: For all δ > 0, there exists k0 such that for all
k ≥ k0, Tk ⊆ Bδ(T ), where
Bδ(T ) =
⋃
t∈T
Bδ(t).
We show first how the claim yields our result. Let  > 0
be given. By the uniform continuity of L (continuity on a
compact set), there exists δ > 0 such that ‖t − t′‖ ≤ δ ⇒
|L(t) − L(t′)| ≤ . Let k be large enough as guaranteed by
the claim. Then, for all t ∈ Tk, there exists t′ ∈ T such that
‖t−t′‖ ≤ δ, and subsequently |L(t)−L(t′)| ≤ . In particular,
there exists t′ ∈ T such that |L(tk)−L(t′)| ≤ . Then, we get
L(tk) ≤ L(t′) +  ≤ L(t?) + . Since L(tk) ≥ L(t?), we get
|L(tk)− L(t?)| ≤ . Therefore, L(tk)→ L(t?). It remains to
prove the claim to establish the first part of the proposition.
Proof of Claim 1: Fix δ > 0. Bδ(T ) is open in T by
construction. Therefore, Tk\Bδ(T ) is closed in T . Since T is
closed in RN , then Tk\Bδ(T ) is also closed in RN . Moreover,
it is bounded, so it is compact. Since
⋂
i≥1
Tk\Bδ(T ) =
⋂
i≥1
Tk
∖Bδ(T ) = T\Bδ(T ) = ∅,
and Tk\Bδ(T ) is a decreasing sequence of compact sets,
there exists k0 such that for all k ≥ k0, Tk\Bδ(T ) is empty.
Similarly, to prove the second part of the proposition, let
sk = argmax
t∈Sk
L(t) and s? = argmax
t∈S
L(t).
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We need to show that L(sk) → L(s?). To this end, consider
the following claim.
Claim 2: For all δ > 0, there exists k1 such that for all
k ≥ k1, S ⊆ Bδ(Sk).
We show first how the claim yields our result. Let  > 0
be given. By the uniform continuity of L, there exists δ >
0 such that ‖t − t′‖ ≤ δ ⇒ |L(t) − L(t′)| ≤ . Let k be
large enough as guaranteed by the claim. Then, for all t ∈ S,
there exists t′ ∈ Sk such that ‖t− t′‖ ≤ δ, and subsequently
|L(t)−L(t′)| ≤ . In particular, there exists t′ ∈ Sk such that
|L(s?)−L(t′)| ≤ . Then, we get L(sk) ≥ L(t′) ≥ L(s?)− .
Since L(sk) ≤ L(s?), we get |L(sk)−L(s?)| ≤ . Therefore,
L(sk)→ L(s?). It remains to prove the claim.
Proof of Claim 2: Fix δ > 0. Bδ(Sk) is open in T
by construction. Therefore, S\Bδ(Sk) is closed in T . Then
S\Bδ(Sk) is closed in RN . Moreover, it is bounded, so it is
compact. Since
⋂
i≥1
S\Bδ(Sk)=S
∖⋃
i≥1
Bδ(Sk)
=⋃
i≥1
Si
∖
Bδ
⋃
i≥1
Si
=∅,
and S\Bδ(Sk) is a decreasing sequence of compact sets,
there exists k1 such that for all k ≥ k1, S\Bδ(Sk) is empty.
Finally, consider Lˆ(s). If Lc is a constant function, then the
statement is trivial. If not, consider s ≥ s0, and let sk be a
decreasing sequence converging to s. Then,
lim
k→∞
Lˆ(sk) = lim
k→∞
max
t:Lc(t)≤sk
L(t) = max
t:Lc(t)≤s
L(t) = Lˆ(s),
where the second equality follows from the first part of the
proposition. Therefore, Lˆ(s) is right-continuous. Now, con-
sider s > s0, and let sk be an increasing sequence converging
to s. Note that,⋃
k≥1
{t ∈ T : Lc(t) ≤ sk} = {t ∈ T : Lc(t) < s} .
Denote the above set by S− and let S = {t ∈ T : Lc(t) ≤ s}.
The second part of the proposition implies that
lim
k→∞
Lˆ(sk) = lim
k→∞
max
t:Lc(t)≤sk
L(t) = max
t∈S−
L(t).
So it suffices to show that S− = S. Clearly, S− ⊆ S since
S is closed and S− ⊆ S. It remains to show that any point t˜
satisfying Lc(t˜) = s is a boundary point of S−. To that end,
note that Lc(t˜) is not a local minimum since Lc(t˜) = s > s0
and Lc is convex by assumption. Therefore, any neighborhood
of t˜ intersects S−. As such S− = S, and Lˆ(s) is left-
continuous, as desired. 
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